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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JOHN B. TENNEY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 930778-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(f) (Supp. 1994). 
TEXT OF STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following statutes, rules and 
constitutional provisions is contained in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1986) 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3 (1986) 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7 (1986) 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13(2) (1986) 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13(3) (1986) 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-14 (1986) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a) (1995) 
Rule 17 (j), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution 
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
In an Amended Information dated March 3, 1993, the State 
charged Appellant/Defendant John Tenney with thirteen counts of 
Selling Unregistered Securities, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-7 (1986) , thirteen counts of Securities Fraud, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1986), one count of acting 
as an Unregistered Securities Broker-Dealer or Sale Agent, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3 (1986) , and two counts of 
Employing Unregistered Agents, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-13(2) (1986). R. 192-197. A copy of the Amended 
Information is contained in Addendum B. 
On May 18, 1993 through June 1, 1993, the case was tried 
to a jury. R. 547, 559, 570, 575, 590, 596, 680. On June 1, 
1993, the jury found Tenney not guilty of counts 3 and 16, and 
guilty of all remaining counts. R. 771-773. On July 26, 1993, 
the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, Judge, Third District Court, 
sentenced Tenney. R. 776-7. A copy of the "Judgment, Sentence 
(Commitment)" in this case is contained in Addendum C. 
On July 26, 1993, Appellant filed a Motion for New Trial, 
which the trial judge denied on October 6, 1993. R. 778, 809. 
Copies of that motion, supporting memorandum and affidavits are 
contained in Addendum D. 
Following a restitution hearing held on September 6, 
1994, the trial court issued its restitution order. R. 2501-04; 
see Addendum E. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Does the improper opening "argument" of the 
prosecutor require a new trial where the prosecutor argued, 
without supporting evidence, that, among other things, Tenney 
2 
"deliberately defrauded" over 300 investors of $4,000,000 to 
$11,000,000 and that investors were "losing their shirts" while 
Tenney was taking their money? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "In reviewing a claim for 
prosecutorial misconduct, this court will determine if the 
prosecutor's remarks called to the attention of jurors 'matters 
they would not be justified in considering in reaching the 
verdict, and, if so, whether there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the misconduct so prejudiced the jury that there would have 
been a more favorable result absent the misconduct.'" State v. 
Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v. 
Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1988)); accord State v. Cummins, 
839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 
(Utah 1993) . 
2. Did the trial court commit plain error where it 
allowed the State's expert witnesses to testify, among other 
things, that certain actions amounted to material omissions or 
misrepresentations under the Utah Uniform Securities Act? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "The trial court has wide discretion 
in determining the admissibility of expert testimony, and such 
decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, 
[citations omitted]." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 
1993) ("Larsen II"). Plain error occurs where "(i) An error 
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful . . . ." State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
3. Did the trial judge commit reversible error by 
improperly instructing the jury as to the elements of the crime, 
failing to adequately define terms which were not otherwise self-
defining, and failing to require unanimity as to the elements? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "The general rule is that an 
accurate instruction upon the basic elements of an offense is 
essential. Failure to so instruct constitutes reversible error." 
State v. Roberts, 711 P.2d 235, 239 (Utah 1985) (citing State v. 
Laine, 618 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980). 
"The jury must be instructed with respect to all the 
legal elements that it must find to convict of the crime charged, 
and the absence of such an instruction is reversible error as a 
3 
matter of law." State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991) 
(citing State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980)). 
Where an instruction was not objected to at trial, this 
Court reviews the issue under a plain error standard. " [T]o 
establish the existence of plain error and to obtain appellate 
relief from an alleged error that was not properly objected to, 
the appellant must show the following: (i) An error exists; (ii) 
the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) 
the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict 
is undermined." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. 
4. Did Appellant intelligently, knowingly and 
voluntarily waive his right to counsel where the trial judge did 
not fully inform him of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "[W]hether the trial court applied 
the proper legal standard in reaching its decision is a question 
of law. State v. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah App. 1993) 
("Bakalov I"). This issue is reviewed under a plain error 
standard which requires that an error occurred which was obvious 
and prejudicial. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. 
5. Did the trial judge commit reversible error in 
denying Appellant's motion for new trial where a juror spoke 
about the case to a friend of Appellant during the course of the 
trial and stated a negative opinion about Appellant? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This is a question of law which is 
reviewed under a correction of error standard. However, the 
underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. State 
v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). 
6. Did the trial judge commit reversible error in 
ordering Appellant to pay $39,000 in restitution to Zieglowsky 
where the ascertainment of the amount of damages was a complex 
question which should have been litigated civilly? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This court will overturn a trial 
court's order of restitution where the "'trial court exceeds the 
authority prescribed by law or abuses is discretion.' State v. 
Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah App. 1992) (citations 
4 
omitted); accord State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d 417, 422 (Utah 1987)." 
State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 980-81 (Utah App. 1993). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES 
POINT 1--Prosecutorial Misconduct in Opening "Argument" 
This issue was raised orally and in writing in the trial 
court. R. 1671-74, 579-80. The improper "argument" can be found 
at R. 998-1000; see Addendum F for transcript of challenged 
remarks. 
POINT II--State's Experts 
This issue must be reviewed under a "plain error" 
standard of review. The improper testimony can be found at 
R. 1471-74, 1549, 1597-99; see Addendum G for transcript of 
testimony. 
POINT III--Instructions 
The objection to Instructions No. 41 and 42, elements for 
"Employing an Unregistered Agent," was raised in the trial court 
at R. 3 74-75; see Addendum H. The remaining issues regarding 
improper jury instructions must be reviewed under a plain error 
standard. The improper instructions can be found at R. 681-743; 
see Addendum I for a representative instruction of each of the 
four types of charges. 
POINT IV--Self-representation 
Appellant's claim that he did not knowingly and 
voluntarily waive his right to counsel must be reviewed under a 
plain error standard. The colloquy by the trial judge is located 
at R. 2234-44; see Addendum J. 
POINT V--Juror Misconduct 
This issue is preserved at R. 778-794. The motion for 
5 
new trial, memorandum in support and affidavits are contained in 
Addendum D. 
POINT VI--Restitution 
This issue is preserved at R. 2377-2380. The transcript 
relevant to this issue is contained in Addendum E. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Counts 1 and 14: Gerald Berg 
In about April 1987, Gerald Berg learned from his good 
friend, Steve Bowers, about a company which had been put together 
to lease phones to rental car agencies. R. 1119. Bowers told 
Berg that the company was listed on the "pink sheets" "and that 
within two weeks it would be coming out." R. 1120. 
Berg subsequently met with Bowers and Kent Jorgensen, who 
explained "how great the investment would be and they would take 
any risk out by signing an agreement" to guarantee Berg's 
investment. R. 1120, 1121. Bowers signed such an agreement, and 
Berg believed there were no risks because Bowers had signed the 
agreement. R. 112 0, 1121. Berg could not remember the specifics 
of the discussion but testified that he was not told certain 
information as part of the transaction or given any financial 
statements. R. 1120, 1122-23. Berg never spoke to Tenney prior 
to the purchase. R. 113 0. 
On April 27, 1987, Berg wrote a check made out to Mobile 
Electronics, Inc. to purchase 10,000 shares of Recom for $20,000. 
R. 1123. When Berg did not receive a stock certificate, he 
contacted Steve Tycksen, an attorney. R. 1126-27. Tycksen and 
Berg contacted Tenney, who disavowed the actions of Bowers and 
6 
Jorgensen, stating that they "had been in trouble prior to this 
situation" and Tenney had bailed them out before. R. 1134-35. 
Tenney denied that Bowers was acting as an agent. R. 1135. Berg 
claimed that Tenney signed an agreement to buy back the stock if 
he did not pursue legal action, but Berg was not present when 
such agreement was executed. R. 1135. Although Tycksen could 
not identify Tenney, Tycksen testified that a man claiming to be 
Tenney signed the agreement. R. 13 04, 13 07. Tycksen testified 
that Bowers also signed a buy-back agreement and that he 
attempted to get Jorgensen to sign such an agreement, but 
Jorgensen refused at the last minute. R. 13 07. 
Tenney testified that he does not recall whether he 
entered into such an agreement with Berg. R. 1908-09. Berg did 
not sign the agreement and the agreement is not dated. R. 1193. 
Counts 2 and 16: Jeffrey Stout 
In March or April, 1987, Jeffrey Stout attended a meeting 
at which Tenney talked about Cellwest. R. 113 9. According to 
Stout, Tenney indicated that the price of stock might increase 
substantially and that the company would be "going public" in a 
couple of weeks. R. 1140. Stout received a brochure about 
Cellwest but did not receive financial statements or other 
information. R. 1141-42. 
Stout wrote a check to Tenney for $3,000 for 1500 shares 
on May 26, 1987. R. 1143. Other than the meeting, most of the 
information Stout received came from Rick Jensen. R. 1148. 
Stout received two stock certificates from Jensen. R. 1144. 
Still later, Jensen gave Stout an agreement dated December 
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1987 which indicated that Tenney would buy back the stock within 
six months at the price of $5 per share. R. 1146, 1151. 
Counts 4 and 17: John Cawley 
John Cawley is an attorney who got together with Tenney 
in about August 1987 after hearing of him from someone who was 
selling either insurance or mutual funds. R. 1155-56. Tenney 
told Cawley that the company was involved in purchasing 
telephones and placing them with rental car agencies. R. 1184. 
Cawley could not remember whether Tenney told him exactly what 
his connection was with the company. R. 1159. Cawley testified 
that Tenney told Cawley that the company was going public "in the 
foreseeable six months" and that the stock would increase in 
value. R. 1160. Tenney gave Cawley a brochure and pamphlet 
about the company. R. 1161, 1162. Cawley knew that any 
investment was risky but testified that Tenney did not 
specifically state to him that this investment was risky. 
R.1163. Cawley also testified that he was not told a number of 
other things about the company. R. 1164. 
A couple weeks after the meeting, Cawley wrote Tenney a 
check for $8,000 for 4000 shares of Cellwest stock. R. 1166. 
When Cawley gave Tenney the check, Tenney signed an agreement to 
buy back the 4000 shares in six months at $5 a share. R. 1167. 
Tenney gave Cawley a stock certificate. R. 1169. 
In April 1988, Cawley asked Tenney to buy back the stock. 
Tenney told him the company had run into problems and there was 
no money available to buy back the stock. Tenney offered, 
however, to give Cawley another 4 000 shares if Cawley would keep 
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the money invested for the next six months. R. 116 9-71. Tenney 
and Cawley entered into an agreement to this effect. R. 1171. 
Cawley remembered the Vancouver Exchange being mentioned but did 
not know whether other stock exchanges were mentioned. R. 1174. 
Cawley obtained a civil judgment against Tenney in the amount of 
$40,000. R. 1181. 
Counts 5 and 18: Ronald Frost 
Ronald Frost first met Tenney in the fall of 1987. 
R. 1200. At the initial meeting, Tenney discussed a company 
which he intended to soon take public. R. 1201. Tenney did not 
mention which stock exchange he hoped to list Cellwest on but did 
indicate that he anticipated that the price of the stock would 
increase substantially. R. 1203. 
When Frost purchased the stock, he and Tenney entered 
into an agreement whereby Tenney agreed to buy back the stock in 
six months at $5 per share. R. 1203. Frost was given a brochure 
on Cellwest but did not receive certain other information about 
the company. R. 12 04, 12 05. 
Frost purchased Cellwest stock with a check made payable 
to Tenney for $10,000. R. 1206. Frost received a stock 
certificate for 4000 shares in November 1987. R. 1210. He 
received another certificate for 4000 shares in June 1988. 
R. 1210. 
Counts 6 and 19: David Ingraham 
In October 1987, David Ingraham's neighbor brought Tenney 
to Ingraham's house so that Ingraham could look at some possible 
investments. R. 1222. Tenney had some stock options which he 
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was offering at $2.50 per share with a buy-back agreement in six 
months at $5 per share. R. 1224. Tenney told Ingraham that the 
company would be involved with cellular phones and that they 
hoped that the cellular phones would be used in a lot of places. 
Ingraham could not recall whether Tenney told him anything about 
whether the company would be going public but remembered 
something about the London stock exchange. R. 1226, 1227. He 
also received some literature about the company. R. 1227. 
Ingraham's wife wrote Tenney a check dated October 7, 
1987 for $2,500 for the purchase of 1000 shares of Cell west 
stock. R. 1227. He received a certificate for 1000 shares of 
stock in November 1987. R. 1228. Ingraham was not given 
specific information about the company or its operating history. 
R. 1229. 
Counts 7 and 20: Kristv and Phillip Holmes 
Kristy Holmes heard about Cellwest from Jensen in October 
1987. R. 1236. Jensen told Holmes that Cellwest provided 
cellular phones to car rental agencies. R. 1236. He also told 
her that she could buy stock at $2 per share, but that the price 
was going up by the end of the year because the stock was going 
public. R. 1236. Jensen told her that the price would double or 
triple and that Tenney would sign a letter agreeing to buy back 
the stock in six months at $5 per share. Holmes testified that 
she was not told a number of things, including the risks of the 
investment, the operating history of Cellwest, any competition 
the company had, restrictions on the stock, or how the proceeds 
from the sale of stock would be used. R. 1238. 
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Based on her relationship with Jensen, Holmes purchased 
250 shares of Cellwest stock with a check for $500 dated October 
19, 1987, made payable to Jensen. R. 1239-40, 1245. Holmes also 
received an agreement letter dated December 31, 1987 to buy back 
the stock which Jensen said Tenney would sign. R. 1240. Tenney 
testified that he did not offer to buy back the Holmes' stock. 
R. 1919. 
Holmes asked Tenney to buy back the stock in June 1988. 
Tenney told her that he was not willing to buy back the stock at 
that time and to call back in two weeks. R. 1241. She called 
back several times until April 1989. R. 1241. Holmes filed a 
small claims action, but the small claims judge ruled against 
her. R. 1241. 
Counts 8 and 21: Dale and Shirley Panting 
On January 15, 1988, Mr. and Mrs. Panting met with 
Tenney. R. 1254. Tenney told Panting that Cellwest was great 
stock and that Panting would double his money in six months. 
R. 1255. Apparently, there was some discussion about the stock 
going public in the future. R. 1256-57. Panting received a 
package of information which included the Confidential Offering 
Memorandum of Emerald Entertainment. R. 1256-57. Panting 
testified that he did not receive specific information about 
Cellwest's operating history. Tenney told him that he had some 
trouble with the federal securities laws. R. 1268. 
Dale Panting purchased 2000 shares of Cellwest with a 
check for $5,000 dated January 14, 1988 and made payable to 
Cellwest. R.1259; Exhibit 76. Mrs. Panting also purchased some 
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shares of Cellwest. R. 1259. Tenney entered into agreements to 
buy back the stock from the Pantings. R. 1261. Panting made the 
investment because Panting's good friend, Craig Peterson, talked 
him into it. R. 1262. 
Counts 9 and 22: Jeffrey Ulibarri 
Jeff's brother, Rocky, and Rick Jensen told Jeff about 
Cellwest in about January 1988. R. 1338. Jeff was not told that 
the stock might go public and no stock exchanges were mentioned. 
R. 1339. The only thing Jensen or Rocky told him was that stock 
purchased for $2 per share would be bought back in six months for 
$5 per share. R. 1340. Jeff gave his money to Richard, who 
wrote a check to cover both of their purchases. R. 1342. Tenney 
testified that he did not offer to buy back the stock of Rocky, 
Richard or Jeff Ulibarri and that the signature on their 
respective "buyback" agreements was not his. R. 1921. 
Counts 10 and 23: Richard Ulibarri 
Richard Ulibarri learned about Cellwest from his brother, 
Rocky, and Jensen in October or November, 1987. R. 1294. Rocky 
was Richard's source of information; in fact, Richard had never 
met Tenney and did not speak to Jensen about purchasing Cellwest 
stock. R. 1294. Rocky told Richard that Cellwest was a company 
that would install cellular phones in rental cars and that they 
had an option to buy stock in the company before that happened. 
R. 12 95. Rocky also told him that with a buy-back agreement, it 
was pretty much guaranteed because after a three-month period, 
you got your money back if you wanted to. R. 1295. 
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Richard was not told anything about the stock going 
public and no stock exchanges were mentioned. R. 1295. He did 
not receive other information about the company, brochures or 
business plans. R. 1296. 
After Rocky told Richard about Cellwest, Richard and Jeff 
decided to invest. R 1297. Rocky wrote out a check to Jensen 
for $4,000 to cover the purchase of 2000 shares by Rocky and 
Jeff. R. 1297A. Rocky gave Richard a buy-back agreement about a 
week after Richard purchased the stock. R. 1299. Tenney 
testified that he did not offer to buy back their stock and 
disputed the signature on the agreement. R. 1921. Richard 
called Cellwest several times about getting his money back but 
did not think he ever talked to Tenney. R. 1299. Rocky did get 
his money back. R. 13 00. 
Counts 11 and 24: Rocky Ulibarri 
Rocky learned about Cellwest from Rick Jensen in November 
or December, 1987. R. 1311. Jensen told Rocky that Cellwest was 
a new company which dealt with cellular phones and had some 
contracts with car rental companies. R. 1312. Jensen told Rocky 
that the company was going public in about six weeks. R. 1312. 
Jensen did not give Rocky any brochures or specific financial 
information about the company but did tell him that if he 
purchased shares at $2 per share, there was a guaranteed buy-back 
at $5 per share. R. 1312, 1313-14. Rocky purchased 500 shares 
of Cellwest with a check dated January 22, 1988 and made out to 
Jensen for $1,000. R. 1315. Up to this point, Rocky had no 
contact with Tenney. R. 1317. Rocky received his money 
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back after his wife contacted Tenney. R. 1322. Although Rocky's 
wife testified that she met Tenney at the Cellwest offices, she 
was unable to identify him in the courtroom. R. 1333-34. 
Counts 12 and 25: James Zieglowsky 
Jensen introduced Zieglowsky to Tenney in December 1987. 
R. 1358-59. Tenney told Zieglowsky that he was in the process of 
setting up a public offering for a cellular phone company of 
which Tenney was president. R. 1360. Tenney indicated the 
company would be listed on various stock exchanges. R. 1362. 
Either Jensen or Tenney told Zieglowsky that for stock purchased 
at $2 per share there was a guaranteed buy-back in 90 days at $5 
per share. R. 1362. Zieglowsky was given a business plan and 
various other information. R. 1363. 
In about January 1988, Zieglowsky purchased shares of 
Cellwest by trading the equity in three real estate parcels. 
R. 1365-66. The three pieces of property were two apartment 
complexes in Ogden and a property in Mountain Green. R. 1367. 
The Zieglowsky agreement required that the stock he purchased was 
to be issued to his children and Jensen. R. 13 73. 
Zieglowsky told his stockbroker to sell the stock on the 
181st day after purchase and to sell even if the stock was only 
listed at $3 per share. R. 1373. Cellwest was not listed, and 
Zieglowsky's attempts to get Tenney to buy back the stock at $5 
per share failed. R. 1373-75. Zieglowsky ultimately received 
tracts one and three back. 
Counts 13 and 26: Marlene Peterson 
Marlene Peterson met Tenney in July 1988. R. 2105. 
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Tenney told Peterson that Cellwest was "coming out" in two weeks 
and would significantly increase in value by December. R. 2110, 
2111. Tenney gave her some information about problems with the 
owners of Cellwest and his problems with the Securities Exchange 
Commission. R. 2113, 2134-35. He did not give her information 
about competition and other things. R. 2113. Peterson purchased 
$2,000 worth of stock but was not sure how many shares she 
purchased. R. 2415. Peterson became concerned about her 
investment and Tenney agreed to return her investment. 
R. 2118-20. 
Count 28: Steven Rick Jensen 
Jensen testified that Tenney discussed ReCom with him and 
that Jensen himself invested in the stock. R. 1050-52. Jensen 
claimed that Tenney promised to give him ten percent in stock for 
any Cellwest investors he brought in. R. 1059-60. Jensen 
personally sold stock to a number of people and claims to have 
given Tenney cash for the various checks made out to him. 
R. 1060-62, 1064. He cannot remember when or where he gave the 
cash to Tenney. 
Count 29: Steven Bowers 
Bowers met Tenney in about mid-1986. R. 1631. At that 
time, they discussed Tenney's interest in acquiring a small 
communications company which Bowers "had." R. 1631. Shortly 
thereafter, Tenney "approached" him about purchasing stock in 
ReCom. R. 1631. Bowers then spoke to Berg about ReCom. 
R. 1632. Bowers gave a packet on ReCom to Berg and a couple 
other people. R. 1632. 
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Bowers testified that at a meeting in about April 1987, 
"they says, 'You know, get anybody that you want. This is great, 
and we are really happy.'" R. 1636. When asked whether he had 
ever entered into an agreement with Tenney about selling ReCom 
stock, Bowers responded that he was dealing almost exclusively 
with Kent Jorgensen. R. 163 7. He then testified that Tenney had 
paid him $400 "for some people [Bowers] brought in." R. 1638. 
The State never asked Bowers whether Tenney told him about 
bankruptcy or SEC action. 
John Tenney 
Tenney's theory of the case was in part that Cellwest 
Communications was exempt from registration because it merged 
into an existing corporation. As a result, the company was not 
subject to the registration requirements of an initial public 
offering ("IPO"). R. 1894-95, 1907-1919, 2186. The trial judge 
instructed the jury to this effect. R. 759. In addition, no 
material omissions or representations were made because the 
disclosure requirements for an IPO did not apply, and Tenney 
otherwise was not involved in a scheme to defraud. R. 2186-87. 
Furthermore, Tenney disavowed the actions of Jensen and Bowers. 
R. 2192-94. 
The State's expert, Ms. Krendl, testified that a merger 
into a previously registered public company was a legitimate way 
for a private company to go public and that disclosure 
requirements for an IPO did not apply where such a merger occurs. 
R. 1607, 1610-12; see also R. 1482. Nielson, who was the 
assistant director of the State Securities Division, had 
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purchased Cellwest stock privately and did not have any reason to 
check on whether it was properly registered. R. 1488-89. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I--PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
Prosecutorial misconduct violating Appellant's due 
process right to a fair trial occurred in this case where the 
State argued in opening that Appellant deliberately defrauded 333 
investors of $4,000,000 to $11,000,000 but presented evidence 
regarding only 14 investors, presented no evidence that Appellant 
received that amount of money, and repeatedly acknowledged that 
receipt by Tenney of purchase money was not required for any of 
the crimes charged. Utah case law does not require "bad faith" 
in order to reverse a conviction based on improper remarks by the 
prosecutors. Even if "bad faith" were required, "bad faith" 
occurred in this case where the State made no attempt to 
establish that other investors were defrauded, made only a weak 
attempt to introduce a clearly inadmissible shareholder list, and 
acknowledged that receipt of purchase money is not required. The 
improper opening remarks were prejudicial in that they permeated 
the entire proceedings, leaving the impression that Appellant was 
involved in a much larger fraudulent operation. 
POINT II--STATE'S EXPERTS 
The trial court committed reversible error in allowing 
the State's witnesses to testify that certain actions were 
material omissions or misrepresentations under the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act ("the Act"), and other legal conclusions under the 
Act. The testimony went beyond the limits set in State v. 
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Larsen, 828 P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1992), affirmed, 865 P.2d 1355 
(1993). 
POINT III--INSTRUCTIONS 
The trial judge gave the jury several improper 
instructions. The errors in those instructions include: (a) no 
requirement in the "Employing an Unregistered Agent" instruction 
that the jury find that Tenney employed the individual "as an 
agent," (b) an improper definition of "agent" under the Act, (c) 
failure to define the term "authorized" for the jury, (d) failure 
to require unanimity as to the act the jury found Tenney 
committed as to each count, (e) failure to define "device, scheme 
or artifice to defraud," and (f) failure to properly define the 
elements of "Unregistered Securities Broker or Agent." Although 
Appellant objected to some of the instructions, others were plain 
error since the error should have been obvious to the trial judge 
based on statutes and/or case law, and the errors were 
prejudicial. 
POINT IV--SELF-REPRESENTATION 
The record fails to establish that Appellant knowingly 
waived his right to counsel. The trial judge did not adequately 
inform Appellant during the waiver colloquy of the procedure to 
be utilized during Appellant's testimony or the dangers and risks 
of self-representation. 
POINT V--NEW TRIAL MOTION 
The trial court abused its discretion in denying 
Appellant's motion for new trial based on juror misconduct where, 
prior to submission of the case to the jury, a juror spoke about 
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the case and expressed a negative opinion about Tenney to someone 
not involved in the case. This Court should apply a presumption 
of prejudice when misconduct of this nature occurs. Even without 
application of such a presumption, however, a new trial is 
required under the circumstances of this case. 
POINT VI--RESTITUTION 
The complex issues regarding the amount of restitution 
owed Zieglowsky, which included a question of whether Zieglowsky 
was at fault in allowing the two properties to go into 
foreclosure and an accurate calculation of the amount of damages 
sustained by Zieglowsky, "are best left to civil litigation." 
See State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d at 983. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRES 
A NEW TRIAL. 
In its opening statement after greeting the jurors, the 
State immediately committed prosecutorial misconduct by making 
inflammatory and prejudicial statements which it did not later 
support with evidence. The State suggested that 333 people had 
been deliberately defrauded by Tenney. R. 998. The prosecutor 
also suggested that Tenney made millions of dollars by defrauding 
investors even though the State was well aware that receipt of 
the money was not required to prove the criminal charges and 
objected successfully to Tenney's attempts to show that he had 
not received proceeds, e.g. R. 998, 1010-11, 1906, 1910. 
The prosecutor began her opening statement by arguing: 
This is a case about innocent, hard-working people who 
got taken in a securities scam. They got taken by a 
smooth-talking salesman who sold them stock that wasn't 
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worth the paper it was written on. The defendant, John 
Tenney, deliberately defrauded dozens of decent people, 
333 people, mostly citizens of Utah, bought Cellwest 
stock for somewhere between 4 million and $11 million. 
While Tenney was collecting all of that money, investors 
were losing their shirts. 
R. 998 (emphasis added). In addition, the State improperly 
outlined victim impact evidence, claiming that James Zieglowsky 
"lost nearly everything he had" and "Jim's children didn't have a 
college fund" as the result of Tenney's actions. R. 1000. 
Appellant made an oral and written motion for mistrial 
based on the prosecutor's opening statement. R. 1671-74. The 
State did not argue that no misconduct occurred. Instead, it 
argued that any misconduct was not prejudicial. R. 1675-76. The 
trial judge denied Appellant's motion, ruling in part that the 
prosecutor did not call to the jury's attention matters not in 
evidence because the prosecutor thought she would be able to get 
the list of alleged shareholders in as evidence. R. 1679.x The 
judge also concluded that it was "highly unlikely" that the 
opening statement was prejudicial. R. 1680. 
The trial judge's conclusion that the prosecutor did not 
commit misconduct in opening was incorrect. Prosecutorial 
misconduct occurs where the prosecutor's questions or remarks 
"called to the jury's attention matters which they would not be 
1
 During sentencing, the State acknowledged that the list 
was not certified. R. 2322. The comments by the State during 
sentencing suggest that the State was aware that the "list was 
not self-authenticating and that it did not have a witness to 
otherwise authenticate the list." R. 2322. Authentication is a 
basic requirement for admissibility. See Utah R. Evid. 901. 
Hence, the State apparently knew at the time it made its opening 
statement that the list was not admissible. 
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justified in considering in reaching their verdict." State v. 
Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287 (Utah App. 1987), cert, denied, 892 P.2d 
13 (Utah 1995) . 
The Utah Supreme Court has discussed prosecutorial 
misconduct in opening statement in several cases. See e.g. State 
v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450 (Utah 1982); State v. Laffertv, 749 
P.2d 1239, 1254-55 (Utah 1988); State v. Trov, 688 P.2d 483, 
485-86 (Utah 1984); State v. Erwin, 120 P.2d 285 (Utah 1941). 
The purpose of an opening statement is to apprise the 
jury of what counsel intends to prove in his own case in 
chief by way of providing the jury an overview of, and 
general familiarity with, the facts the party intends to 
prove. State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285 
(1941). It is generally accepted that an opening 
statement should not be argumentative. 
Williams, 656 P.2d at 452; see also State v. Erwin, 120 P.2d 285 
(during opening, the prosecutor "should not make a statement of 
any facts which he cannot legally prove upon the trial"). The 
Erwin court held that it was misconduct for the prosecutor to 
"recite conversations which were hearsay and incompetent as 
evidence" and that "it was improper for him to overstate the 
conversations which were admissible in evidence." Erwin, 120 
P.2d at 313. 
Some courts consider prosecutorial misconduct which 
occurs in opening statement more egregious than prosecutorial 
misconduct in closing because the prosecutor had an opportunity 
to plan the opening statement, delivered the opening statement in 
a less charged atmosphere than closing, and the statement set the 
tone for the entire proceeding. See e.g. United States v. 
Johnson, 767 F.2d 1259, 1263 (8th Cir. 1985); State v. 
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Echevarria, 860 P.2d 420 (Wash. App. 1993). 
In Johnson, the court stated: 
We are troubled by the prosecutor's conduct. That the 
comment was made during opening statement makes it more 
egregious than a similar remark would be during closing 
argument. In [United States v.1 Lee [,743 F.2d 1322, 
1330 (8th Cir. 1984)], it was noted that certain 
improprieties during closing argument may be excused as 
the product of provocation by defense counsel. 743 F.2d 
at 1253. An opening statement, however, does not unfold 
in such a charged atmosphere. We presume that the 
opening statement in a case as complex as this was 
carefully planned. 
Johnson, 767 F.2d at 1275 (emphasis added). 
In Echevarria, the Court held that the prosecutor's 
remarks during opening were so egregious that they deprived the 
defendant of a fair trial. His remarks "set the tone for the 
entire trial" and could not be cured by a cautionary instruction. 
Echevarria, 860 P.2d at 422. The Court stated: 
"Argument and inflammatory remarks have no place in the 
opening statement." State v. Kroll, 87 Wash.2d 829, 835, 
558 P.2d 173 (1976). Appeals to the jury's passion and 
prejudice are improper. State v. Claflin, 3 8 Wash. App. 
847, 850, 690 P.2d 1186 (1984), review den'd, 103 Wash.2d 
1014 (1985). It is the prosecutor's duty to "seek a 
verdict free of prejudice and based on reason." State v. 
Huson, 73 Wash.2d 660, 663, 440 P.2d 192 (1968), cert, 
den'd, 393 U.S. 1096, 89 S.Ct. 886, 21 L.Ed.2d 787 
(1969) . The prosecutor's duty to act impartially derives 
from his or her position as a quasi-judicial officer. 
State v. Kroll, supra 87 Wash.2d at 835, 558 P.2d 173. 
Echevarria, 860 P.2d at 422; see also State v. West, 617 P. 2d 
1298, 1300 (Mont. 1980) (prosecutor's opening statement regarding 
hearsay evidence later ruled inadmissible was reversible error); 
United States v. Stahl, 616 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(reversible error occurred where prosecutor made references to 
defendant's wealth and told jury in opening that the case 
involved tremendous amounts of money); State v. Kenny, 319 A.2d 
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232 (N.J. App. 1974) (reversible error occurred in a case where 
although the charge involved a single act of corruption, the 
prosecutor stated in opening that the case involved a "story of 
corruption" about "the only way you could do business" in the 
county); People v. Washington, 204 N.E.2d 25, 29 (111. App. 1965) 
(reversible error to indicate that murder victim left wife and 
children). 
In this case, the first prong of Troy was met where the 
State argued the following inflammatory matters which it did not 
later prove: 
1. Mr. Tenney deliberately defrauded over 3 00 additional 
investors. 
2. Mr. Tenney collected millions of dollars from the 
sale of the securities. 
3. Investors "were losing their shirts," i.e. going 
broke. 
4. The Zieglowsky children had no college fund after the 
transaction with Tenney. 
5. Zieglowsky lost everything. 
In addition to being irrelevant and inflammatory 
argument, these improper assertions were not supported by the 
evidence. First, the State's only attempt to establish that 
Tenney deliberately defrauded over 3 00 people was its feeble and 
unsuccessful attempt to introduce an uncertified shareholder 
list. R. 2322. The shareholder list was not admitted, and even 
if it had been, the list itself would not establish that 
individuals listed had been defrauded. R. 1438-40. In addition, 
the State did not establish that Tenney deliberately defrauded 
anyone. Instead, it based its case on the willfulness mental 
state required by the Act. See Larsen II, 865 P.2d at 1358-60. 
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Nor did the State prove that Tenney received proceeds 
from $4,000,000 to $11,000,000 from the sales. The State 
recognized that receipt of proceeds was not an element of the 
charges and repeatedly objected when Tenney attempted to 
establish that he had not received proceeds from certain sales, 
e.g. R. 1010-1011, 1906, 1910. 
The State also did not establish that any investors "lost 
their shirts" or went broke as the result of the Cellwest 
purchase. In addition, although Zieglowsky testified that the 
Cellwest stock was earmarked for his children's education2, there 
is no evidence that the children did not have other funds 
available for college. R. 1373. 
Finally, there is no evidence that Zieglowsky lost 
everything as the result of his purchase of Cellwest stock. Two 
of the three parcels of real estate which he transferred to 
Tenney to pay for the stock were ultimately returned to 
Zieglowsky. R. 1384-88. He continued to deal with Tenney, 
bringing him a number of properties which included a ski resort, 
Canyon Racquet Club and two apartment buildings. R. 187-88. 
A review of the evidence and opening statement 
establishes that the prosecutor made inflammatory and irrelevant 
argument and discussed matters not established by the evidence. 
The trial judge's incorrect conclusion that the prosecutor's 
statement was not misconduct was improperly based on the judge's 
2
 This victim impact evidence was irrelevant and 
inflammatory. Although Tenney, a pro se defendant, did not know 
to object, both the trial judge and the prosecutor should have 
limited this inflammatory testimony. See Utah R. Evid. 402, 403. 
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determination that the prosecutor thought she would be able to 
introduce the shareholders list. This ruling was essentially a 
determination that the prosecutor did not act in bad faith rather 
than a determination as to whether the opening statement was 
improper. 
While case law from the Utah Supreme Court does not 
clearly define whether bad faith is required for reversal based 
on improper argument in opening, the most recent Utah Supreme 
Court decision to discuss prosecutorial misconduct in opening did 
not require bad faith. See State v. Troy, 688 P.2d at 487. 
Since the Utah Supreme Court did not require bad faith in Troy, 
the controlling precedent for this Court requires only that the 
prosecutor argued improperly in his or her opening statement, and 
that such argument prejudiced the defendant. See Troy, 688 P.2d 
at 4873; Erwin, 120 P.2d at 313. 
In addition, the better rule appears to be that 
misconduct need not be intentional or in bad faith to require 
reversal. See People v. Bolton, 589 P.2d 396, 398 (Cal. 1978). 
In Bolton, the court pointed out that harm caused the defendant 
by improper opening remarks "'is nonetheless an injury because it 
was committed inadvertently rather than intentionally.' 
3
 In dictum in State v. Williams, 656 P.2d at 452, a 
decision issued prior to Troy, the Supreme Court suggested that 
bad faith might be required for a reversal based on prosecutorial 
misconduct in opening. The Supreme Court refused to address the 
issue of whether bad faith is required for reversal based on 
improper opening remarks in a footnote in State v. Lafferty, 74 9 
P.2d at 1255 n.13. Given the decision in Troy which reversed the 
conviction based in part on prosecutorial misconduct in opening 
without requiring bad faith, this Court should review the issue 
under the two-prong Troy test and not create an additional bad 
faith requirement. 
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[citations omitted]." Bolton, 589 P.2d at 398. In other words, 
a defendant's right to a fair trial is impinged upon by improper 
remarks regardless of whether the prosecutor made the remarks in 
bad faith. 
Even if bad faith were required, the circumstances of 
this case demonstrate that the requirement was met. The only 
attempt the State made to establish that additional shareholders 
existed was its attempt to introduce an uncertified and 
unauthenticated shareholders list. R. 2322. Basic knowledge of 
the rules of evidence would indicate that this list was 
irrelevant, highly prejudicial, and inadmissible due to the lack 
of authentication. Hence, the prosecutor should have known that 
it would be difficult if not impossible to admit this list. In 
addition, the prosecutor apparently knew that the State did not 
have a witness to authenticate the list. R. 2322. See State v. 
Kenny, 319 A. 2d at 241 ("A prosecutor may in his opening state 
only the facts he intends in good faith to prove by competent 
evidence."); Mitchell v. State, 245 So.2d 834 (Ala. 1971) ("for 
the prosecutor to lay claim to that which he cannot prove, either 
by reason of fact or legal inadmissibility, calls into question 
his good faith in making the statement"); Licklitter v. 
Commonwealth, 60 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Ky. App. 1933) ("There is no 
occasion and no excuse for attempting to influence the jury in 
advance by improper statements as to evidence which counsel knows 
he cannot prove or will not be permitted to introduce."). 
Furthermore, even if the State had been successful in 
admitting this list, it was nevertheless improper to argue the 
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scheme of defrauding those hundreds of other investors where the 
State did not plan to introduce evidence that the others were 
defrauded and such evidence would be plainly irrelevant and 
prejudicial. The State went beyond all reasonable bounds in this 
argument. It set the tone for the entire case by setting up 
Tenney as an individual who had gotten rich while defrauding 
hundreds of people for millions of dollars, and supplementing 
that claim with a tale of inadmissible victim impact evidence. 
This opening statement improperly appealed to the jury's emotions 
and suggested that it should convict Tenney based on this bigger 
scheme and not based on the evidence regarding the thirteen 
alleged victims in this case. The obvious impropriety of this 
argument and its egregious and inflammatory nature demonstrate 
any required bad faith. See Kenny, 319 A.2d at 241 (prosecutor 
acted in bad faith requiring reversal where he argued in opening 
that jury would hear a story of corruption about the way business 
was done in the county). 
Finally, for prosecutorial misconduct to require 
reversal, it must be harmful. State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 
(Utah 1992). The test for "harmfulness" is whether there is a 
reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the jury would have 
reached a different result or a probability that the jurors were 
influenced by the remarks. Emmett, 83 9 P.2d at 784-85; State v. 
Span, 819 P.2d 329 (Utah 1991). The legal basis for a 
prosecutorial misconduct claim is that the misconduct deprives a 
defendant of his federal right to due process and to confront 
witnesses against him. See State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1254; 
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Troy, 688 P.2d at 486. 
In Troy, the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
prosecutorial misconduct required a new trial because the proof 
of defendant's guilt of the arson charge was not compelling and 
"[t]he jurors 'probably were influenced by' the remarks of the 
prosecutor." Id. at 487. The Court concluded that "[w]hile the 
trial court properly attempted to correct the errors, the 
potential for harm, the probability for harm, and the continued 
efforts of the prosecutor were too flagrant to be corrected." 
Id. 
Other courts have found prejudice where the prosecutor's 
improper comments have set the tone for the entire trial or 
suggest a larger criminal operation than that which is charged in 
the case before the jury. See e.g. Echevarria, 860 P.2d at 421-
22 (prosecutor's comments regarding the war on drugs were 
flagrant and highly prejudicial); Kenny, 319 A.2d at 241 
(prosecutor's references to corruption and the way business was 
done in the country prejudicial because defendant "might well 
have been convicted because he was a part of the allegation of 
widespread corruption of Hudson County"); People v. Reimann, 42 
N.Y.S.2d 599 (1943) (prejudicial error occurred where prosecutor 
"injected into the case at the outset the claim that the 
defendant was German and a Nazi sympathizer"); Edwards v. State, 
212 P.2d 150, 152 (Okla App. 1949) (prejudicial error occurred 
where prosecutor argued in opening that the defendant was well 
known liquor dealer). 
In Erwin, 120 P.2d at 313, the Utah Supreme Court held 
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that the prosecutor's misconduct in opening was not reversible 
error because the statements related to minor details in the 
chain of evidence. By contrast, in the present case, the 
statements regarding a large scheme in which over three hundred 
investors were deliberately defrauded set the tone for the entire 
case and permeated the trial. 
The trial judge recognized the prejudicial effect of 
admitting a list of names of people alleged to have invested in 
Cellwest. He stated that the extensive list of names and listed 
dollar amounts totaling millions of dollars would create "a high 
likelihood that [the jury] may use this particular list and 
construe that these were also victims of fraud." R. 1439. The 
State took the opening argument a step further than the list by 
arguing that the other individuals were victims of fraud and that 
Tenney pocketed millions of dollars. See R. 998. 
There can be little doubt as to what the prosecutor was 
"trying to convey to the jury and little doubt that they picked 
it up." See West, 617 P.2d at 1300. In this case where the 
prosecutor made prejudicial improper remarks during opening which 
she knew or should have known would not be supported by the 
evidence and where those remarks set the tone for the entire 
trial, suggesting that Appellant was involved in a fraudulent 
operation which was much larger than the thirteen transactions 
charged, a new trial is required. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN ALLOWING THE STATED EXPERT WITNESSES 
TO TESTIFY THAT CERTAIN ACTIONS VIOLATED THE 
UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT. 
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The trial judge qualified two attorneys to testify for 
the State as experts "in federal and state securities matters." 
R. 1542. Cathy Krendl, a Colorado attorney, testified during the 
State's case in chief. R. 1538-1616.4 She went beyond the 
limits of expert testimony articulated in State v. Larsen, 828 
P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1992), affirmed 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993) 
("Larsen I"), and testified that certain information was material 
under the Utah Uniform Securities Act and failure to disclose 
certain material would be a material omission or misstatement 
under the Act. R. 15 97-99.5 She also improperly gave her legal 
conclusion that the buy-back agreements were securities under the 
Utah Act. R. 154 9. 
Steve Nielsen, assistant director of the State Division 
of Securities, testified during the State's case in chief and 
rebuttal. The State listed a number of examples and Nielsen 
testified that each would be material. R. 1471-74. While this 
type of questioning may arguably be permissible under Larsen, the 
State took the questioning a step further and asked: 
Q: Mr. Nielsen, you have just listed several categories 
of information that you view as material under Utah 
Securities Law. Would the failure to disclose such 
information be a material omission under Utah law? 
A: In my opinion, it would be. 
R. 1474 (emphasis added). Nielsen also testified that the 
4
 Much of Krendl's testimony was based on her review of 
an inadmissible shareholder list which showed out-of-state 
investors. R. 1566. 
5
 Ms. Krendl also testified that the material given to 
investors did not meet disclosure requirements under the Act. 
R. 1601-02. 
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Cellwest Business Plan did not meet disclosure requirements under 
the Act (R. 1475) and predictions and financial statements did 
not comply with Utah law. R. 1476-77. 
Rules 702 and 704, Utah Rules of Evidence govern expert 
testimony. While Rule 704 allows expert testimony regarding 
ultimate issues of fact, it does not permit an expert to give 
legal conclusions which "tell the jury what result to reach." 
Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Utah App. 1991), cert. 
denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). In Davidson v. Prince, this 
Court stated: 
"The Advisory Committee notes make it clear that 
questions which would merely allow the witness to tell 
the jury what result to reach are not permitted. Nor is 
the rule intended to allow a witness to give legal 
conclusions." Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236, 
24 0 (5th Cir. 1983). Thus, an expert generally cannot 
give an opinion as to whether an individual was 
"negligent" because such an opinion would require a legal 
conclusion. See e.g. Shahid v. City of Detroit, 889 F.2d 
1543 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that expert testimony was 
not admissible on ultimate legal conclusion of whether 
correctional officers were negligent in failing to 
provide necessary medical treatment to inmate); see also 
Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805, 808-09 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(holding that allowing legal expert to testify as to 
whether there had been a "search" in plaintiff's 
residence constituted reversible error; summarizing cases 
in which second, fourth, fifth and sixth circuits held 
that expert witnesses may not give legal conclusions); 
Hogan v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 812 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 
1987) ("Opinion testimony is not helpful to the 
factfinder if it is couched as a legal conclusion."); 
Smith v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 814 F.2d 1481, 1485 
(10th Cir. 1987) (upholding trial court's exclusion of 
expert's opinion as to whether defendant's actions were 
"prudent mine practices" on grounds that question called 
for a legal conclusion). 
Davidson, 813 P.2d at 1231. 
In Larsen I, 828 P.2d at 492-93, this Court considered 
whether "expert opinion testimony concerning the 'materiality' of 
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information not disclosed to investors" was "improper legal 
testimony" or simply factual testimony supporting an element of 
the crime of securities fraud. Larsen I, 828 P.2d at 492-3. 
This Court recognized that although under Rule 704, "expert 
opinion is 'not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate 
issue to be decided by the trier of fact,'" such expert opinion 
nevertheless should not include legal conclusions. Id. at 493. 
This Court pointed out: 
The danger of allowing expert opinion couched as a legal 
standard is that "the jurors will turn to the expert, 
rather than to the judge, for guidance on the applicable 
law." 3 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, 
Weinstein's Evidence, § 704 [02] . See also First Sec. 
Bank v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1258 (Utah 
1989) (legal duty owed by trustee to trustor is question 
of law to be determined by the court, and not question of 
fact suitable for testimony by expert in real estate 
law); Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 153 (Utah 1987) 
(attorney's expert opinion as to effect of joint tenant's 
conveyance was inadmissible statement of law). 
Larsen I, 828 P.2d at 493. 
In reaching its decision in Larsen I, this Court relied 
on the decision in United States v. Leuben, 812 F.2d 179, 183 
(5th Cir. 1987), modified, 816 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1987)6, which 
"underscored" "[t]he distinction between a factual evidentiary 
showing of materiality and impermissible opinion on the legal 
question of materiality." Larsen, 828 P.2d at 493. This Court 
pointed out: 
In Leuben, the Fifth Circuit held that expert opinion on 
materiality was admissible as being fact-oriented. The 
court reasoned that whether certain false statements 
6
 In United States v. Leuben, 816 F.2d 1032, 1033 (5th 
Cir. 1987), the court modified its prior decision and vacated the 
portions of the decision which were relied on by this Court in 
Larsen I. 
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would have had "the capacity to influence" a loan officer 
as a factual element of the government's case was 
distinguishable from the questions of whether the 
statements were legally "material." 
Larsen I, 828 P.2d at 493. This Court held that the testimony as 
to "materiality" in Larsen I was factual testimony in support of 
an element and did not cross the line into improper legal 
conclusion. Larsen I, 828 P.2d at 493. 
On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court pointed out that 
the expert witness "was expressing his opinion that some of the 
material that Larsen had omitted from the securities documents 
could have been important or significant to an investor.10" 
Larsen II, 865 P.2d at 1361. The Court emphasized, however, that 
the expert witness "did not, as Larsen suggests, testify that 
Larsen was guilty, nor did the [expert witness] testify that, as 
a matter of law, the facts established the legal standard of 
materiality." Id. at 1361 fn.10. 
Because the testimony in Larsen I and Larsen II related 
to a factual issue rather than a legal conclusion, the trial 
judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the testimony in 
that case. See also Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359 
(4th Cir. 1986) (emphasizing the need to draw the line "between 
proper expert evidence as to facts, the inferences to be drawn 
from those facts, and the opinions of the expert [as to those 
facts], on the one hand, and testimony as to the meaning and 
applicability of the appropriate law, on the other hand"). 
By contrast, in United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 140 
(2d Cir. 1988), the court held that error occurred where a 
securities expert "drew directly upon the language of the statute 
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and accompanying regulations concerning 'manipulation' and 
'fraud'11 and testified for the government that in his opinion, 
the defendants were "active participants" in a scheme to 
manipulate the stock or defraud. Scop, 846 F.2d at 140. The 
"use of statutory and regulatory language indicating guilt" 
demonstrated that the expert testimony in Scop crossed the line 
into inadmissible legal conclusion. Id. at 142. The Scop court 
distinguished acceptable opinion testimony from unacceptable as 
follows: 
For example, telling the jury that a defendant acted as a 
"steerer" or participated in a narcotics transaction 
differs from opining that the defendant "possessed 
narcotics, to wit, heroin with intent to sell," or aided 
and abetted the possession of heroin with intent to 
sell," the functional equivalent of Whitten's testimony 
in a drug case. It is precisely this distinction, 
between ultimate factual conclusions that are dispositive 
of particular issues if believed, e.g. medical causation, 
and "inadequately explored legal criteria," that is drawn 
by the Advisory Committee's Note." 
Scop, 846 F.2d at 142; see also Torres v. County of Oakland, 758 
F.2d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 1985) (opinion given in language tracking 
statute is an improper legal conclusion); Owen v. Kerr-McGee 
Corp., 698 F.2d 236, 239 (5th Cir. 1983) (Rule 704 does not allow 
witness to tell the jury what conclusion to reach or give legal 
conclusions). 
In the present case, the two expert witnesses, at the 
prompting of the prosecutor, went beyond giving factual testimony 
in support of an element. Indeed, rather than simply stating 
certain information would be significant to investors, the 
witnesses opined that certain information or the failure to 
supply certain information would be a material misrepresentation 
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or omission under the Act. R. 1597-99, 1771-74. Furthermore, 
rather than outlining disclosure requirements for the jury, both 
witnesses instructed the jury that certain documents did not meet 
disclosure requirements under the Act. R. 1601-02, 1475-77. In 
addition, rather than defining a security for the jury and 
letting it decide whether Tenney offered or sold unregistered 
securities, Ms. Krendl gave her legal conclusion that the buy-
back agreement was a security. R. 1549.7 
Although Tenney did not object to the improper testimony, 
plain error occurred where the trial judge allowed the witnesses 
to testify as to whether the State established the elements of 
the crime. This error was obvious under Larsen I, Larsen II and 
Davidson. It was prejudicial in that the expert witness 
instructed the jury that certain elements were established. 
The improper expert opinion requires reversal of all of 
the convictions in this case. The expert witnesses directed the 
jury as to the material omission or misrepresentation element of 
the thirteen counts of Securities Fraud. The direction that the 
buy-back agreement was a security affected all other counts. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL JUDGE IMPROPERLY 
INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE ELEMENTS OF THE 
CRIMES. 
A. THE TRIAL JUDGE'S FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY 
INSTRUCT THE JURY AS TO THE ELEMENTS OF 
EMPLOYING AN UNREGISTERED AGENT (COUNTS 28 AND 
29) REQUIRES REVERSAL OF THOSE COUNTS. 
7
 Ms. Krendl's legal conclusion that the buy-back 
agreement was security under Utah law confused the issues for the 
jury. Pursuant to the version of § 61-1-14 (i) (1986) in effect 
at the time of the transactions in this case, the buy-back 
agreements were arguably exempt from registration assuming they 
were securities. 
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Instructions No. 41 and 42 outline the elements for 
Counts 28 and 2 9 which charged Tenney with Employing an 
Unregistered Agent, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3(2) 
(1993). The instructions list those elements as: 
1. Sometime subsequent to April 17, 1987, in the State 
of Utah, John B. Tenney, a broker-dealer or issuer; 
2. Willfully; 
3. Employed [Bowers or Jensen]; 
4. To offer or sell any security; 
5. To [individuals]; 
6. When [Bowers or Jensen] was not licensed as an agent 
with the Utah Division of Securities. 
Instruction No. 45 defines agent. It states in relevant 
part 
You are instructed that the term "agent", for purposes Of 
Utah's securities laws, means any individual other than a 
broker-dealer who represents a broker-dealer or issuer in 
effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of 
securities. 
R. 746. See Instructions 41, 42 and 45 in Addendum K. 
These instructions failed to adequately outline the 
elements of "Employing an Unregistered Agent" as they are set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3. The elements instructions for 
"Employing an Unregistered Agent" require only that Tenney 
"employed" the individual and not that he employed Bowers or 
Jensen as an "agent" as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13(2). 
The language of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3 clearly states that "[i]t 
is unlawful for any broker-dealer or issuer to employ or engage 
an agent unless the agent is licensed." By failing to include 
the "as an agent" language, the trial court failed to set forth 
an essential element of the crime of "Employing an Unregistered 
Agent." 
While at first blush, a distinction between the term 
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"employ" and "employ as an agent" might appear unimportant, 
further review of the instructions demonstrates that because the 
instructions did not require the jury to find that Tenney 
employed Jensen or Bowers as an agent, it did not require them to 
look to Instruction No. 45 for definition of the term "agent." 
Hence, the jury could have found a violation of "Employing an 
Unregistered Agent" without finding that Bowers or Jensen acted 
as an agent as defined by the Utah Uniform Securities Act. 
Instruction 44 (R. 744-45) defines "employ" as "to engage 
one's service, hire, or use as an agent or substitute in 
transacting business, or to utilize or make use of." The 
multiple definitions given for the term "employ" demonstrate that 
the jury was not required to find that Tenney employed Bowers or 
Jensen "as an agent" even though "use as an agent" was one of 
several alternative meanings for the term "employ." In other 
words, based on the instructions, the jury could have defined 
"employed" as "hired" to sell a security even though Bowers or 
Jensen did not fit within the definition of "agent" contained in 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13(2). 
Tenney raised this argument in the trial court by 
requesting that the trial judge instruct the jury that he 
employed Bowers or Jensen "as his agent." R.374, 375. The State 
resisted the argument even though Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3 plainly 
requires that a defendant "employ or engage an agent" to be 
guilty of employing an unregistered agent. See R. 668. 
Furthermore, even if the jury did look to Instruction 
No. 45 for the definition of "agent," that instruction did not 
37 
accurately define the term "agent" under the Act. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-13(2) defines "agent" as follows: 
(2) "Agent" means any individual other than a 
broker-dealer who represents a broker-dealer or issuer in 
effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of 
securities. "Agent" does not include an individual who 
represents an issuer, who receives no commission or other 
remuneration, directly or indirectly, for attempting to 
effect purchases or sales of securities in this state, 
and who: 
(a) effects transactions in securities exempted by 
Subsection 61-1-14 (1) (a), (b), (c), (i), or (j); 
(b) effects transactions exempted by Subsection 61-1-
14(2) , or; 
(c) effects transactions with existing employees, 
partners, officers, or directors of the issuer. A 
partner, officer, or director of a broker-dealer or 
issuer, or a person occupying a similar status or 
performing similar functions, is an agent only if he 
otherwise comes within this definition. 
While Instruction No. 45 contains the first sentence of 
this statute, it does not contain the exceptions which follow. 
At least two of these exceptions or areas which the term "agent" 
does not cover are arguably applicable in this case, as 
demonstrated by the other instructions and the evidence. Tenney 
claimed an exemption in this case based on 61-1-14(1) (i) (1986) 
and 61-1-14 (2) (n), (q), (k) and others. R. 757. Hence, the 
failure to completely define the term "agent" or outline the 
elements of Employing an Unregistered Agent requires reversal of 
Counts 28 and 29. 
Although Tenney did not object to Instruction No. 45, use 
of this erroneous instruction to define the term "agent" under 
the Act requires reversal of Counts 28 and 2 9 under a plain error 
analysis. Pursuant to Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209, a three-prong test 
is applicable to determining whether erroneous jury instructions 
require reversal under a plain error approach. That three-prong 
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test requires a determination of whether (1) the instruction was 
erroneous; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
judge; and (3) the error was prejudicial. In Dunn, the Court 
held that the erroneous jury instruction required reversal 
because the Court could "not be sure that the jury did not 
convict Dunn on the basis of reckless mental state alone." Dunn, 
850 P.2d at 1209; see also Roberts, 711 P.2d at 239 ("general 
rule is that an accurate instruction upon the basic elements of 
an offense is essential"); Jones, 823 P.2d at 1061 ("absence of 
[instruction on all legal elements of a crime] is reversible 
error as a matter of law"); Vigil v. State, 859 P.2d 659, 663 
(Wyo. 1993) (plain or fundamental error occurs where trial court 
fails to properly instruct the jury on an element of the crime); 
Chambers v. People, 682 P.2d 1173, 1179 (Colo. 1984) (failure to 
properly instruct jury as to all elements of crime is plain 
error); State v. Brokus, 858 S.W.2d 298, 302-03 (Mo. App. E.D. 
1993) (plain error not to include definition of "serious physical 
injury" and to require exposure to physical injury rather than 
serious physical injury); United States v. Prieto-Teias, 779 F.2d 
1098 (5th Cir. 1986) (plain error occurred where trial court 
failed to instruct jury as to meaning of "unlawfully"). 
All three of the considerations outlined in Dunn for 
finding plain error in instructing the jury are present in this 
case. First, as set forth supra at 37-8, the instructions did 
not adequately define the term "agent." Second, the error should 
have been obvious to the trial judge because Instruction No. 45 
based its definition on the statute but omitted the necessary 
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exclusions as stated in the definition statute. See Dunn, 850 
P.2d at 1209 (error should have been obvious to trial judge from 
a review of applicable statutes). Third, the error was 
prejudicial because the jury could have convicted Tenney of 
"Employing Unregistered Agents" without making a finding that 
Tenney employed Bowers or Jensen "as an agent" as required and 
defined by the Act. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209 ("error was 
prejudicial because [the Court] cannot be sure that the jury did 
not convict Dunn on the basis of a reckless mental state alone"). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADEQUATELY 
INSTRUCT THE JURORS AS TO ANY CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTABLE TO TENNEY FOR THE 
ACTIONS OF OTHER PERSONS. 
Other than the incomplete definition of the term "agent" 
contained in Instruction No. 45, Instruction No. 52 is the only 
instruction outlining for the jury the law regarding Tenney7s 
legal responsibility for the actions of Bowers, Jensen and 
others. See Addendum L for copy of Instruction No. 52. 
Instruction No. 52 informed the jury that Tenney was responsible 
for the actions of any agents or "authorized salesman" whose 
statements Tenney "authorized" without giving the jury any 
definition of the term "authorized." The use of the term 
"authorized" incorporated the law of agency whereas the term 
"agent" apparently referred to "agent" under the Act, as 
incorrectly defined in Instruction No. 45. 
Despite the complex nature of the law of agency and the 
multiple meanings of the term "authorized" in the context of 
agency law, the trial judge did not include an instruction 
defining that term for the jury. Under general principles of 
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agency law, an agent is "authorized" to act on behalf of a 
principal pursuant to either actual or apparent authority. See 
Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 
1094-95 (Utah 1988). 
Actual authority incorporates the concepts of express 
and implied authority. Express authority exists whenever 
the principal directly states that its agent has the 
authority to perform a particular act on the principal's 
behalf. Implied authority, on the other hand, embraces 
authority to do those acts which are incidental to, or 
are necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish or 
perform, the main authority expressly delegated to the 
agent. Implied authority is actual authority based upon 
the premise that whenever the performance of certain 
business is confided to an agent, such authority carries 
with it by implication authority to do collateral acts 
which are the natural and ordinary incidents of the main 
act or business authorized. This authority may be 
implied from the words and conduct of the parties and the 
facts and circumstances attending the transaction in 
question, [footnotes omitted]. 
In comparison, an agent's apparent or ostensible 
authority flows only from the acts and conduct of the 
principal. 
Clark Clinic Corp, 762 P.2d at 1094-95. 
In Clark Clinic Corp., the Supreme Court further 
explained apparent authority by quoting its previous decision in 
City Elec. v. Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 
1983) . 
Where corporate liability is sought for acts of its agent 
under apparent authority, liability is premised upon the 
corporation's knowledge of and acquiescence in the 
conduct of its agent which has led third parties to rely 
on the agent's actions. Nor is the authority of the 
agent "apparent" merely because it looks so to the person 
with whom he deals. It is the principal who must cause 
third parties to believe that the agent is clothed with 
apparent authority . . . It follows that one who deals 
exclusively with an agent has the responsibility to 
ascertain that agent's authority despite the agent's 
representations. [footnote omitted]. 
Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d at 1095, quoting City Elec., 672 
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P.2d at 90 (emphasis added). Hence, apparent authority must be 
established by the acts of the principal and not the acts of the 
agent. Id. 
Although the complex nature of agency law has spawned 
numerous cases and an extensive discussion in Restatement 
(Second) of Agency, the trial judge failed to define the term 
"authorized" or to otherwise guide the jury in determining 
whether Tenney was legally responsible for the actions of others. 
Failure to adequately define the term "authorized" 
requires that Counts 1-26 be reversed since this Court "cannot be 
sure that the jury did not convict" Tenney based on the actions 
of others which did not amount to "authorized" activity under 
law. At the very least, the charges based on the transactions 
with Berg (Counts 1 and 14), Kristy and Phillip Holmes (Counts 7 
and 20) , Jeffrey Ulibarri (Counts 9 and 22), Richard Ulibarri 
(Counts 10 and 23), and Rocky Ulibarri (Counts 11 and 24), 
require a reversal since the jury was required to rely on an 
agency theory in order to convict Tenney. Indeed, none of these 
individuals spoke to Tenney prior to the purchase of stock. R. 
1130, 1135, 1294, 1317, 1238-40, 1338-40. 
Failure to define for the jury significant terms which 
are necessary to its determination on the elements is plain 
error. See Brokus, 858 S.W.2d at 302-03; Prieto-Teias, 779 F.2d 
at 1105; discussion regarding plain error in jury instructions 
supra at 38-9. The jury was given no guidance as to how to 
determine whether Bowers, Jensen or others were "authorized" to 
act on behalf of Tenney. This error in failing to define for the 
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jury a significant and essential term which was not self-defining 
should have been obvious to the trial judge given the complex 
nature of agency law and the extensive discussions in cases 
regarding the term "authorized." It is impossible to determine 
whether the jury's verdicts on Counts 1-26 were predicated on a 
correct understanding of what an authorized salesman is. 
Reversal of those counts is therefore required. 
C. THE INSTRUCTIONS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY GUIDE 
THE JURY REGARDING THE THIRTEEN COUNTS OF 
SECURITIES FRAUD. 
1. The Instructions Failed to Require Unanimity 
as to the Act the Jury Believed Tennev Committed. 
Instructions No. 27 through 3 9 outlined the elements for 
securities fraud involving thirteen different purchasers. 
R. 713-748. Those instructions differed only in terms of the 
names of the individual purchasers and outlined the elements of 
securities fraud as follows: 
1. At sometime subsequent to April 17, 1987, in the 
State of Utah, John B. Tenney, directly or 
indirectly; 
2. In connection with the offer or sale of any security; 
3. To [alleged purchaser]; 
4. Willfully; 
5. Either 
a). employed a device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, OR 
b). made an untrue statement of a material fact or 
omitted to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, OR 
c). engaged in an act, practice, or course of 
business which operated or would operate as a 
fraud or deceit upon any person. 
R. 713-48; see Addendum I. 
The instructions outline three possible alternative acts 
required for the crime of securities fraud and do not require 
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unanimity as to a specific act. The elements instructions 
themselves suggest that the jury need only unanimously agree that 
one of the alternative acts was committed and not that the jurors 
agree as to which act. None of the other instructions require 
unanimity as to the act, and Instruction No. 48 confuses the 
issue by suggesting that "[e] ach count may have a different or 
the same misrepresentation or omission." R. 749; see 
Addendum M.8 
As this Court recognized in State v. Saunders, 259 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 24 (UtahApp. 1995), 
There can be no question that jury unanimity is necessary 
as to all elements of a crime. See Utah Const, art. I, 
§10; Utah R. Crim. P. 2 K b ) ; Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 
211, 216 (Utah 1993), cert, denied, U.S. , 114 
S.Ct. 706 (1994); State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 257-
58 (Utah 1988) . 
Id. at 25. 
The only question then is whether in the context of this 
pro se case, it was plain error for the trial judge to fail to 
instruct the jury that it was required to reach a unanimous 
decision as to the act committed by Tenney. 
In Saunders, 259 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26, this Court applied 
the three-part Dunn test for determining whether the failure to 
require unanimity was plain error. See discussion regarding Dunn 
test supra at 38-9. Rather than analyzing each prong of the Dunn 
8
 Instruction No. 65 is the only instruction which refers 
to unanimity. That instruction states in part that "it requires 
a unanimous agreement of all the jurors to find a verdict." See 
Addendum M for copy of Instruction No. 65. This instruction 
discusses the "verdict" as the jury's decision as to all counts 
and suggests that the jury need only be unanimous as to guilt or 
innocence and not that it be unanimous as to the basis for 
finding each element. 
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test, this Court analyzed the requirement that the error should 
have been obvious to the trial court. This Court held that the 
failure to require unanimity was not plain error in Saunders 
since the defendant stated that the issue was one of first 
impression in Utah and Utah Supreme Court case law on unanimity 
did not provide a uniform rule which could be extended to the 
case. Saunders, 259 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26. 
In determining that case law did not establish a uniform 
rule as to unanimity, this Court in Saunders cited State v. 
Russell, 733 P.2d 162, 163-68, 169-71, 175-78 (Utah 1978), and 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 562-68, 577-80, 585-88 (Utah 
1987) ("Tillman I"). A review of Tillman I and Russell, however, 
demonstrates that unanimity as to the act committed by the 
defendant was required under Utah law prior to the decision in 
Saunders. 
In Russell, the Utah Supreme Court considered whether 
unanimity as to mens rea under the second degree murder statute 
was required. In holding that unanimity as to mental state for 
second degree murder is not required, the Russell court made it 
clear that "[t]here are limitations on the rule" and explicitly 
suggested that one such limitation is that "the jury must 
unanimously agree on the actus reus element of the offense 
[where] the prohibited acts fell into two conceptually distinct 
categories." Russell, 733 P.2d at 167. 
This Court also indicated in Saunders, 259 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 26, that Tillman I was evidence of the "Utah Supreme Court's 
struggle in dealing with unanimity problems" and cited Tillman I 
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as "indicating division of views among justices as to whether 
jury must unanimously agree on specific aggravating circumstance 
necessary to support first degree murder conviction." Saunders, 
259 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26. Although the justices did express 
differing views in Tillman I as to whether unanimity is required 
as to aggravating circumstances in a capital homicide case, a 
majority of the justices agreed that such unanimity is required. 
See Tillman I, 750 P.2d at 567, 590-91.9 In addition, a majority 
reached the issue even though it was not raised in the trial 
court. Id. 
Any confusion which arguably may have existed as to the 
requirement that there be a unanimous verdict as to the act 
committed by the defendant was clarified in Tillman II, 855 P.2d 
211 which was issued after judgment was entered against Kirk 
Saunders but shortly before the trial in 
the present case. Hence, the obviousness analysis in this case 
differs from that in Saunders and necessarily requires a review 
of the clarifying discussion in Tillman II. 
In Tillman II, all of the justices indicated that in 
Tillman I, a majority of the Court had agreed that jury unanimity 
as to aggravating circumstances is required. Tillman II, 855 
9
 Justices Durham and Zimmerman determined in Tillman I 
that unanimity as to aggravating circumstances was required and 
the instruction was "inadequate to inform the jury of its 
obligation to decide unanimously regarding the charged arson and 
burglary." Tillman I, 750 P.2d at 588. They would have reversed 
the conviction based on the absence of a unanimous verdict as to 
the aggravating circumstances. Tillman I, 750 P.2d at 590-91. 
Justice Stewart agreed that unanimity was required but determined 
that the jury had been adequately instructed as to that 
requirement. Tillman I, 750 P.2d at 567. 
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P.2d at 216, 223-24, 226-27. The lead opinion in Tillman II 
states: 
. . . Notwithstanding federal law, the Utah constitution 
does require jury unanimity on all elements of a crime. 
On direct appeal, a majority of this court held that 
jurors are constitutionally required to agree unanimously 
on each element of a criminal offense, including at least 
one aggravating circumstance in a capital offense. 
[footnote omitted]. 
Tillman II, 855 P.2d at 216 (emphasis added). The remaining 
justices in their concurring and dissenting opinions agreed that 
jury unanimity was required as to all elements. Tillman II, 855 
P.2d at 222, 223, 226. Hence, Tillman II, which was issued less 
than two months before the trial in the present case began, 
established that jury unanimity is required for all elements of a 
crime. Tillman II, 855 P.2d at 216. 
Other jurisdictions have held that the failure to give a 
unanimity instruction is plain error where some of the jurors may 
have convicted the defendant based on different actions than 
those found by the rest of the jurors. See e.g. United States v. 
Payseno, 782 F.2d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 1986) . Where confusion as 
to the basis of the conviction exists, it is plain error for the 
judge to fail to instruct the jury that unanimity is required. 
Id.; see also United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 463 (3rd Cir. 
1987) (where government prosecutes under multiple theories, 
reversible error occurs where "there is a significant possibility 
that [the] error may have resulted in a non-unanimous verdict in 
violation of the sixth amendment11); United States v. Gipson, 553 
F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977) (defendant's sixth amendment right to 
unanimous verdict violated where instructions authorize 
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conviction based on one of several alternative acts); Covington 
v. State, 703 P.2d 436, 440 (Alaska App. 1985) ("Where one jury 
instruction may encompass two separate incidents, the trial judge 
must instruct the jury that . . . the jurors must be unanimous as 
to the incident or incidents of which they find the defendant 
guilty."). 
Under the three-prong Dunn analysis, plain error occurred 
in failing to adequately instruct the jury that it must reach a 
unanimous verdict as to the act which constituted the crime of 
securities fraud. First, pursuant to Tillman II and Saunders, 
the failure to require a unanimous verdict was error. Second, 
the error should have been obvious to the trial judge in light of 
the clearly articulated unanimity requirement in Tillman II and 
other case law. Finally, the error was prejudicial since there 
is no assurance that the jury reached a constitutionally required 
unanimous verdict as to the act committed by Tenney to sustain 
each count of securities fraud. 
2. The Instructions Failed to Adequately Define 
"Device, Scheme or Artifice to Defraud" for the 
Jury. 
An additional error occurred in regard to the securities 
fraud instructions based on the trial court's failure to define 
the term "employed a device, scheme or artifice to defraud" which 
is one of the three alternative acts listed in Instructions 27 
through 39. R. 713-24. In Scop, 846 F.2d at 140, the court 
pointed out that under the federal statute, "'manipulation,' 
'scheme to defraud' and 'fraud' are not self-defining terms but 
rather have been the subject of diverse judicial 
48 
interpretations." 
The trial judge has the obligation to adequately guide 
the jury by instructing it as to the elements of the crime and 
the definition of any legal concepts that are not self-defining. 
See Prieto-Teias, 779 F.2d at 698; Brokus, 858 S.W.2d at 302-03. 
Although the Act lists these terms under § 61-1-1 
(securities fraud), it does not include definitions for the 
terms. Nor is there Utah case law defining the term "device, 
scheme or artifice to defraud." 
The lack of case law or statutory guidance does not, 
however, free the trial judge from his obligation to adequately 
instruct the jury regarding the meaning of this term. In State 
v. Swenson, 838 P.2d 1136, 1137 (Utah 1992), decided before the 
trial in this case, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the trial 
court's ruling that the failure of the Act to define specific 
terms used in the Act violated due process because the Act 
"failed to advise a reasonable person of the nature of the 
securities transactions which may not be effected without 
registration as an agent with sufficient clarity . . . ." Id. 
Although the Swenson court did not reach the vagueness issue, the 
decision in Swenson informed trial judges of potential due 
process concerns where the Act does not define a term which is 
not otherwise self-defining and raised the issue of instructing 
juries regarding complex terms contained in the Act. 
The three-prong Dunn test for reversibility is met in 
this case. First, it was error to not instruct the jury on a 
legal concept which was not self-defining. Second, that error 
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should have been obvious in light of Swenson, Jones and 
a review of the Act. Finally, the error is prejudicial because 
we cannot be sure that the jury did not convict Appellant based 
on an improper definition of the term "device, scheme or artifice 
to defraud." 
D. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY AS TO THE ELEMENTS OF "UNREGISTERED 
SECURITIES BROKER OR AGENT." 
Instruction No. 40 listed the elements of "Unregistered 
Securities Broker or Sales Agent" as follows: 
1. Sometime subsequent to April 27, 1987, John B. 
Tenney; 
2. Transacted business in the State of Utah as a broker-
dealer or agent by; 
3. Willfully; 
4. Offering or selling any security; 
5. To any one of the following individuals: Gerald 
Berg, Jeffrey Stout, David Baker, John Cawley, Ronald 
Frost, David Ingraham, Kristy and Phillip Holmes, 
Dale and Shirley Panting, Jeffrey Ulibarri, Richard 
Ulibarri, Rocky Ulibarri, James Zieglowsky, or 
Marlene Peterson; 
6. When John B. Tenney was not registered as a broker-
dealer or agent with the Utah Division of Security; 
"broker-dealer," for purposes of Utah's securities 
laws, means any person engaged in the business of 
effecting transactions in securities for the account 
of others or for his own account. 
R. 746. 
As set forth supra at 37-8, Instruction No. 45 improperly 
defines the term "agent" under the Act. The first sentence of 
the definition contained in § 61-1-13(2) is contained in 
Instruction No. 45. However, Instruction No. 45 does not contain 
the statutory exceptions. 
The instructions also do not adequately define "broker-
dealer." Instruction No. 45 contains the first sentence of the 
definition found in Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13(3) but does not 
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contain the exclusions outlined in the statutory definition. 
Because the instruction fails to adequately define 
"agent" or "broker-dealer," the conviction on Count 27, 
"Unregistered Securities Broker or Sale Agent," should be 
reversed. See Brokus, 858 S.W.2d at 302-03; discussion supra at 
37-8 regarding plain error in failing to adequately instruct 
jury. The instructions are erroneous in that they do not contain 
a complete definition of "agent." This error should have been 
obvious to the trial judge since the statute contains the 
complete definition. The error is prejudicial since the jury 
could have found that Tenney fit within the statutory exclusion 
for the term "agent" or "broker-dealer." This Court cannot be 
sure that the jury convicted Tenney based on a correct definition 
of these terms. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209. 
E. THE FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT IT 
MUST REACH A UNANIMOUS VERDICT AS TO EACH 
ELEMENT REQUIRES REVERSAL OF ALL COUNTS. 
As set forth supra at 44-8, the jury must unanimously 
find each element of the crime in order to convict a defendant. 
See Saunders, 259 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25; Tillman I, 750 P.2d at 
567, 590-91; Tillman II, 855 P.2d at 216, 223-24, 226-27. The 
trial judge failed to instruct the jury that unanimity as to each 
element was required. Indeed, the only instruction pertaining to 
unanimity informed the jury that it must reach a unanimous 
verdict. R. 766. This requires only that the jury agree that 
Tenney was guilty of something and not that they reach a 
unanimous verdict as to which act he committed. 
Failure to instruct the jury as to the requirements that 
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they reach a unanimous verdict as to each element was an error 
which should have been obvious to the trial judge in light of 
Saunders, Tillman I and Tillman II; see discussion supra at 44-8. 
This error was harmful and prejudiced all counts as follows. 
First, there is no assurance that the jury reached the 
constitutionally mandated unanimous verdict on the securities 
fraud counts since they were presented with three alternative 
acts from which to choose as a basis for each of those counts; 
see discussion supra at 43-48. In addition, on the counts 
involving Bowers or Jensen, there is no assurance that the jury 
reached unanimity as to Tenney's responsibility based on an 
"agency" theory or his own actions. 
Second, the State presented alternative theories to 
support the "Selling Unregistered Securities" counts and the 
"Employing an Unregistered Agent" counts. The State apparently 
claimed that the initial sale of stock as well as the issuance of 
buy-back agreements involved the offer or sale of securities. 
See R. 1549. There is no assurance that some of the jurors did 
not convict Tenney on these counts based on the determination 
that the buy-back agreements were unregistered securities while 
others convicted him based on the initial sale of stock. If the 
jury clumped these two alleged acts together and determined that 
Tenney sold an unregistered security at one point or another, the 
constitutionally mandated unanimous verdict was not reached on 
the unregistered securities counts. 
In addition, in counts where the State presented evidence 
of actions by Bowers or Jensen, there is no assurance the jury 
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reached a unanimous verdict based on an "agency" theory versus 
direct acts by Tenney. Similarly, some members of the jury may 
have determined that Jensen and Bowers were agents when they 
offered the buy-back agreements whereas others may have decided 
they acted as agents in the initial sale of stock. There is no 
assurance under the circumstances of this case that the jury 
reached a unanimous verdict as to act on the unregistered 
securities counts or the Employing Unregistered Agents counts. 
The "Unregistered Securities Broker or Sales Agent" 
instruction presents a similar problem in that it allowed the 
jury to convict Tenney if it found he was a "broker-dealer" or 
"agent." Since no instruction required the jury to find 
unanimously that he was one or the other, there is no assurance 
that the jury reached a unanimous decision on that element. They 
may well have reached a unanimous "verdict" as required by 
Instruction No. 65 that he was either a broker-dealer or agent 
but disagreed as to which role he played. 
The trial judge's failure to instruct the jury that it 
was required to reach a unanimous verdict as to each element of 
each count was plain error. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209. 
POINT IV. APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WERE VIOLATED WHERE THE 
RECORD DOES NOT ESTABLISH THAT HE VOLUNTARILY 
AND KNOWINGLY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantee an 
accused the right to self-representation. Faretta v. California, 
422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Bakalov I, 
849 P.2d at 632; State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987); 
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State v. Probe1. 815 P.2d 724, 731 (Utah App. 1991). 
11
 [T] he exercise of the right of self-representation 
necessarily constitutes a waiver of the right to counsel [.]" 
Bakalov I, 849 P.2d at 633; Probe1, 815 P.2d at 731; Frampton, 
737 P.2d at 187. Because self-representation involves a waiver 
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, "trial courts have an 
affirmative duty to see that a defendant who chooses 
self-representation does so knowingly and intelligently, 
[citations omitted]." Probe1, 815 P.2d at 731; Frampton, 737 
P.2d at 187. "The decision must also be voluntary." Bakalov I, 
849 P.2d at 633, citing Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187; see also State 
v. Bakalov, 862 P.2d 1354, 1355 (Utah 1993) ("Bakalov II"). 
A waiver of the right to counsel is required in part 
because "when an accused manages his own defense, he 
relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional 
benefits associated with the right to counsel." Schafer v. 
State, 459 So.2d 1138, 1139 (Fla. App. 1984). 
In order to knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily 
waive his right to counsel, a defendant "should be made aware of 
the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the 
record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his 
choice is made with eyes open.'" Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187. In 
Bakalov I, this Court recognized: 
Some courts have held that if the trial court fails to 
create an adequate record demonstrating (1) that the 
court explored the defendant's capacity to select 
self-representation; and (2) a factual basis for finding 
defendant did not knowingly and intelligently opt 
self-representation, the appropriate remedy is to reverse 
and remand for a new trial. Schafer v. State, 459 So.2d 
1138, 1139 (Fla. App. 1984); State v. Watkins, 25 Wash. 
App. 358, 606 P.2d 1237, 1239 (1980). 
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Bakalov I, 849 P.2d at 634-35. 
In Bakalov II, 862 P.2d at 1355, the Supreme Court relied 
on Judge Greenwood's decision in Bakalov I which pointed out that 
"the trial court never advised Dr. Bakalov of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation and thus could not then or 
now assess his responses to that advice." The Supreme Court 
directed the trial court "to conduct a colloquy on the record 
between the court and Dr. Bakalov to insure that he understands 
the risks of self-representation and thereby waives his 
constitutional right to assistance of counsel." Bakalov I, 862 
P.2d at 1255. 
In Frampton, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that an 
on-the-record colloquy between the court and defendant which 
includes "penetrating questioning by the trial court" "is the 
preferred method of ascertaining the validity of a waiver because 
it insures that defendants understand the risks of 
self-representation." The Court included a sample colloquy. 
Frampton, 73 7 P.2d at 188 n.12; see Addendum P for copy of 
Frampton colloquy. "While this colloquy is not mandatory, it 
provides a helpful framework for the trial courts." Bakalov I, 
849 P.2d at 633, citing Drobel, 815 P.2d at 732. 
Although an on-the-record colloquy is the preferred 
method for establishing waiver, a waiver can be established in 
the absence of such a colloquy by reviewing the record for "any 
evidence in the record which shows a defendant's actual awareness 
of the risks of proceeding pro se." Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188. 
Circumstances to be considered and which the record must show 
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are: (1) "that the defendant understood the seriousness of the 
charges and knew the possible maximum penalty"; (2) that the 
defendant was aware of technical rules of evidence and procedure 
and that such rules would be applied to him; and (3) that the 
defendant was made aware "that presenting a defense was not just 
telling a story." Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188. The focus is on 
whether the defendant understands the ramifications of 
self-representation and "what he or she is giving up by choosing 
self-representation." Bakalov I, 849 P.2d at 633. See also 
Briscoe v. State, 606 A.2d 103, 108 (Del. Supr. 1992) (listing 
guidelines for determining whether defendant knowingly and 
voluntarily waived right to counsel). 
While a defendant's mental health and background are also 
relevant in determining whether the defendant knowingly and 
intelligently waived his right to counsel, the fact that he is 
well educated "is not dispositive as to whether he understood the 
relative advantages and disadvantages of self-representation in a 
particular situation." Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188. 
In the present case, the record does not establish that 
Mr. Tenney was made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of 
self-representation so that he was able to knowingly and 
intelligently waive his right to counsel. In particular, 
Mr. Tenney was not made aware of the procedure to be utilized 
when he testified or that he would be unable to simply tell a 
story in presenting his defense. 
During the pretrial conference held on March 3, 1993, the 
trial judge engaged Mr. Tenney in an on-the-record colloquy 
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regarding Tenney's self-representation. R. 2234-44. A 
transcript of that colloquy is contained in Addendum J. A review 
of that colloquy demonstrates that the trial judge questioned Mr. 
Tenney regarding his educational background, previous experience 
representing himself in a civil case, his belief in his ability 
to represent himself, his understanding of the burden of proof in 
a criminal case, his understanding that the court would appoint 
an attorney to represent him, and the possible penalty and 
serious nature of the charges. R. 2234-44. 
The trial judge did not, however, inform Mr. Tenney that 
the rules of procedure and evidence would be strictly followed in 
his case, that he could not present a defense by telling a story, 
that when he testified, he would be required to prepare questions 
ahead of time, and that standby counsel would not be permitted to 
address objections made by the State, rephrase questions after 
the trial court sustained a State's objection, or otherwise 
elaborate, inquire further or refine questions when necessary. 
The only discussion regarding the rules of evidence and 
procedure was as follows: 
The Court: One of the concerns the court has, Mr. 
Tenney, is that it sounds as if based upon your education 
and experience, it would appear to me you certainly have 
the ability and capability, in all likelihood, to master 
the facts. But one of the concerns I have, Mr. Tenney, 
is even though you may have the ability to understand and 
master the facts, presenting those facts consistent with 
the rules of procedure and rules of evidence is something 
very different and something which usually requires not 
only that one have the training of legal education, but 
also the benefit and experience of practicing in the area 
of criminal law to be informed and knowledgeable 
regarding the rules of evidence as it relates to criminal 
law issues, as well as the rules of criminal procedure. 
Those are the kinds of concerns that I have regarding 
57 
your ability to adequately represent yourself. Why is it 
you believe vou are going to be able to master those 
rules in order to be able to present your defense in this 
case? 
R. 2235-36 (emphasis added). Rather than addressing the 
technical hurdles involved in the rules of procedure and evidence 
in responding to the court's concerns, Appellant focused on his 
knowledge of securities law and the fact that he had an 
"assistant" who was a lawyer in the Legal Defender's office. 
R. 2237. 
Tenney's response failed to demonstrate that he was aware 
that the technical requirements of the rules of procedure and 
evidence would be applied to him and that he would be required to 
frame his questions and make his objections within the parameters 
of those rules. Indeed, Tenney's response suggests that he was 
under the impression that he would be able to simply tell his 
story and that he was the person best equipped to tell that story 
because of his securities background.10 R. 2237. 
During the course of trial, around the time the State 
rested, the trial judge informed Tenney for the first time that 
he would not be permitted to testify in narrative form. R. 1723-
24, 1726. Instead, the trial judge instructed Tenney to prepare 
the questions which he would answer, then give a copy to standby 
10
 Tenney's response also suggests a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the role of standby counsel. Standby counsel 
does not act as an "assistant" to a pro se litigant, and a pro se 
defendant does not have a "right" to standby counsel. Instead, 
standby counsel's role is limited so as not to undermine the 
jury's perception that the defendant is representing himself. 
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984). A pro se defendant 
does not have a right to effective assistance of counsel or 
effective assistance of standby counsel. Faretta v. California, 
422 U.S. at 834-35 n.46. 
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counsel and the judge. R. 1726-28. Standby counsel was limited 
to reading the questions prepared by Tenney and was not permitted 
to elaborate, follow up or reword questions when the trial judge 
sustained an objection. E.g. 1726-28; 1768, 1779-80, 1795, 1796, 
1806, 1807, 1809, 1813, 1819-20, 1842, 1843, 1846, 1851-52. 
In outlining the procedure to be utilized, the trial 
judge stated that he wanted to give Tenney some "advance notice" 
as to the procedure to be utilized. This advance notice was too 
late and should have been given when Tenney was questioned 
regarding his desire to represent himself. The trial judge's 
failure to advise Tenney of dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation as contemplated by Faretta, Frampton, 
Bakalov I, and Bakalov II requires a new trial. 
"[T]he appointment of standby counsel, for a defendant 
who proceeds pro se is not an acceptable alternative to a knowing 
and intelligent waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel." 
Briscoe, 606 A.2d at 109 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 
(1938)); United States v. Weltv, 674 F.2d 185 (3d Cir. 1982); 
United States ex. rel. Axselle v. Redman, 624 F.Supp. 332 (D. 
Del. 1985); see also Burks v. State, 748 P.2d 1178 (Alaska App. 
1988). In the present case, where standby counsel did not play 
an active role and merely advised Tenney off the record, the 
appointment of standby counsel did not cure the defective waiver. 
See Redman, 624 F.Supp. at 339. 
Although Appellant did not raise this claim in the trial 
court, reversal and remand for a new trial is nevertheless the 
appropriate remedy. See Bakalov I, 84 9 P.2d at 634-35; Drobel, 
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851 P.2d at 731. In Probe1, this Court explicitly stated that 
"trial courts have an affirmative duty to see that a defendant 
who chooses self-representation does so knowingly and 
voluntarily." Probe1, 815 P.2d at 731. Bakalov I recognized 
that the failure to create a record which demonstrated that the 
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel 
requires reversal and remand for a new trial. Bakalov I, 849 
P.2d at 634-35. It should have been obvious to the trial judge 
that he was required to fully inform Tenney of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation and to otherwise make sure 
that Tenney knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his 
right to counsel before allowing Tenney to proceed without 
counsel. 
Furthermore, this is an issue that would evade review if 
this Court were to require a precise technical objection in order 
to raise a claim that a pro se defendant did not properly waive 
his right to counsel. Pro se defendants who are not trained in 
the law and express a desire to represent themselves will rarely, 
if ever, know the requirements for self-representation and will 
not know the necessity of on-the-record objections unless so 
informed. The trial judge should have the responsibility to 
ensure that a pro se defendant properly waives his right to 
counsel regardless of whether that defendant requests the proper 
procedure. Tenney was harmed by the error because he proceeded 
to trial without knowing the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation and may well have opted to exercise his right to 
counsel had he known the limits which would be placed on his 
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testimony and the role of standby counsel.11 See Bakalov I, 849 
P.2d at 634-35; Bakalov II, 862 P.2d at 1355. 
Under these circumstances, the trial judge's failure to 
advise Tenney of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation requires a new trial. 
POINT V. THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
BASED ON JUROR MISCONDUCT. 
Following trial, Appellant filed a motion for new trial 
based on juror misconduct. R. 778. Appellant submitted 
affidavits from Richard D. Christensen, D.D.S. and Margaret 
Wallace. R. 791-94; see Addendum D. The affidavits indicated 
that one of the jurors, Dr. Richard L. Barnett, shared an office 
with Dr. Christensen. R. 791-94, 804-06. On or about May 25, 
1993, during the course of the instant trial, Dr. Barnett had a 
conversation with Dr. Christensen, during which Dr. Barnett 
indicated that the defendant in the case on which he was a juror 
was John Tenney, who was charged with securities fraud. R. 791, 
804-05. Dr. Barnett also told Dr. Christensen that he thought 
Christensen was a friend of Tenney's. R. 791, 804-05. 
During the course of the conversation, Dr. Barnett 
indicated that Tenney was a "really bad guy." Dr. Christensen 
responded that his experiences with John Tenney had all been 
good. R. 792. Margaret Wallace who worked in the office 
11
 It should be noted that following the trial, Tenney 
requested counsel. Appellate counsel directly represents Tenney 
and is not in the role of standby counsel. 
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reported the same conversation. R. 793-94.12 
The parties stipulated to the trial judge deciding the 
issue based on the motion, memoranda and affidavits. R. 807. 
The trial judge denied Defendant's motion for new trial "for the 
reasons set forth in plaintiff's memorandum in opposition 
thereof." R. 809. The trial judge then signed an order prepared 
by the prosecutor which denied the motion for new trial for the 
following reasons: 
1. The juror, Dr. Richard Barnett, may have 
violated rule 17 (j), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, by 
briefly conversing with another doctor about defendant's 
business practices; however, that action does not justify 
a mistrial. 
2. Dr. Barnett's actions did not indicate that he 
had formed an opinion or bias against defendant; neither 
was there any indication that the actions would impact on 
the juror's deliberation in the case. 
"'The right to trial by a fair and impartial jury is^  an 
important one which should be scrupulously safeguarded.'" Logan 
City v. Carlsen, 799 P.2d 224, 225 (Utah App. 1990), quoting 
State v. Durand, 569 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1977). Juror 
misconduct requires a new trial under many circumstances. See 
State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243 (Utah 1992) (juror misconduct in 
answering voir dire questions requires new trial); State v. 
Swain, 835 P.2d 1009 (Utah App. 1992) (potential prejudice which 
arose when juror spoke with victim during recess required new 
trial); State v. Ahrens, 479 P.2d 786 (Utah 1971) (juror 
misconduct in visiting city offices and talking to employees 
12
 According to Dr. Barnett's affidavit, he told 
Dr. Christensen he could not talk about the case. Nevertheless, 
he thereafter stated that "Tenney appeared to be a 'slick 
operator'" but that Dr. Barnett did not know yet whether Tenney 
had broken any laws. R. 805. 
during trial required new trial in embezzlement prosecution 
against city recorder); State v Thorne, 117 P. 58 (Utah 1911) 
(juror misconduct requires new trial where juror leaves other 
jurors during lunch break after submission of the case to make a 
telephone call). 
Where a juror has contact with parties, their attorneys, 
witnesses, or court personnel which "goes beyond mere incidental, 
unintended and brief contact," a rebuttable presumption of 
prejudice arises. Logan City v. Carlsen, 799 P.2d at 226, 
quoting State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985) . Prejudice is 
also presumed in other contexts of juror misconduct. See e.g. 
Ahrens, 479 P.2d 786 (prejudice presumed where juror went to city 
offices during embezzlement trial); Thorne, 117 P. at 60 
(prejudice presumed where juror made telephone call after 
submission of case); State v. Miller, 875 P.2d 788, 791-92 (Ariz. 
1994) ("Prejudice may be presumed here, because '[i]n a criminal 
case, any private communication, contact or tampering, directly 
or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter 
pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed 
presumptively prejudicial . . . ' [citations omitted]."). 
Various court rules attempt to protect against tainting 
jurors through improper contact. Rule 17 (j), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and Rule 47(k), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
require that jurors be admonished that they not converse "on any 
subject of the trial" or "form or express an opinion thereon 
until the case is finally submitted to them." Rule 606(b), Utah 
Rules of Evidence provides for "[i]nquiry into validity of 
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verdict or indictment" where a juror is exposed to extraneous 
prejudicial information or "any outside influence was improperly 
brought to bear upon any juror." 
In Ahrens, 4 79 P.2d at 787-88, the Utah Supreme Court 
reversed a criminal conviction where one of the jurors visited 
city offices during the second day of a city recorder's trial for 
embezzlement. In support of its decision, the Court stated: 
We have no way of determining whether or not the conduct 
of the juror influenced his judgment in arriving at a 
verdict. We adhere to the rule stated in prior decisions 
of the court that the law requires of the juror such 
conduct during the time that his verdict may be above 
suspicion as to it having been influenced by any conduct 
on his part during the trial. 
In Thorne, the Utah Supreme Court reversed a conviction 
for first degree murder based on a juror's misconduct in placing 
a telephone call to an unidentified person after the case was 
submitted to the jury. Although the record did not contain 
information as to the person the juror called or the nature of 
the communication, the Court applied a presumption of prejudice 
and reversed the conviction. It reasoned that the actions of the 
juror were "unauthorized and forbidden" and the State failed to 
establish that the communication was harmless. Thorne, 117 P. at 
66-7. The Court noted: 
And generally in cases where it has been held that the 
misconduct of a juror engaging in unauthorized 
communications with others was not prejudicial, and did 
not vitiate the verdict, it was affirmatively and clearly 
made to appear what the conversation or communication 
was, and that it was entirely harmless, and unrelated to 
the case, or, in cases of a separation, that the 
circumstances were such that the juror was not, and could 
not have been, exposed to prejudicial or harmful 
influences by reason of the separation. 
Various other Utah decisions have considered whether 
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juror misconduct requires a new trial. In Arellano v. Western 
Pacific Railroad Company, 298 P.2d 527 (Utah 1956), the Court 
held that a new trial was not required where one of the parties 
alleged that a juror conversed with his brother, who was an 
attorney, about the case. The Court determined that the 
complaining party had not established that such a conversation 
had actually occurred. The Court further indicated that if such 
a conversation had occurred, it would violate Rule 47(k), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Under such circumstances, reversal 
would be required if the complaining party could establish that 
the conversation influenced the jury. See also Gee v. Smith, 541 
P.2d 6 (Utah 1975) (new trial not required where juror 
inadvertently shown picture of victim while in the restroom 
where photographs of victim were introduced into evidence; 
prejudicial effect of inadvertent incident not established under 
these circumstances). 
In the present case, Juror Barnett had a conversation 
about the case in violation of Rule 17(j), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. The affidavits submitted by both parties establish 
that the conversation and violation occurred. The only issue for 
this Court, then, is whether the violation was prejudicial. This 
Court must first determine whether a presumption of prejudice 
arises based on the misconduct. Pike, Ahrens and Miller support 
a determination by this Court that any time juror misconduct 
occurs, such a presumption arises. Such a presumption is 
appropriate given the sanctity of the right to fair trial by 
impartial jury and the recognition that it is difficult to 
65 
determine the extent of any impact of the improper contact. 
For instance, in the present case, regardless of whether 
a presumption is applied, it is apparent that at least one juror 
had formed an opinion about Tenney prior to submission of the 
case. The difficulty of changing an opinion once formed and 
voiced is reflected in the oft repeated instruction which 
cautions jurors not to form or voice an opinion until all of the 
evidence is heard. Furthermore, it is difficult to ascertain in 
this case the impact of information that Tenney knew Juror 
Barnett's office mate. Juror Barnett may well have disliked his 
office mate or had some ongoing dispute which left him with no 
respect for the other dentist. Knowledge that the other dentist 
knew and admired Tenney may well have impacted negatively on 
Juror Barnett. 
In this case where the rules of criminal procedure were 
violated by the exposure of the juror to extraneous information 
and the juror may well have been influenced by that exposure, a 
new trial is required. 
POINT VI. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN ORDERING APPELLANT TO PAY $3 9,000 IN 
RESTITUTION TO ZIEGLOWSKY. 
Over Appellant's objection (R. 2375-2380), the trial 
judge ordered Appellant to pay $39,000 in restitution to 
Zieglowsky. R. 2503-04; see Addendum E.13 The restitution to 
Zieglowsky is the only restitution amount contested by Appellant. 
R. 2350. The State sought restitution to Zieglowsky based on the 
13
 The Court ordered additional restitution on other 
counts totalling $53,950. Appellant stipulated to those amounts. 
R. 2365. 
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losses arguably sustained by Zieglowsky in connection with two 
tracts of land. R. 2367-75. 
The State proffered its testimony regarding the losses 
sustained by Zieglowsky. In regard to the first piece of 
property, the State proffered that in 1988, the property was 
valued at $75,000, with an indebtedness of $27,000. R. 2368. 
The State further proffered that the first tract was refinanced 
and Zieglowsky signed a note for $48,000. R. 2370. Of that 
amount, $20,000 went to pay off the indebtedness; the remainder 
apparently went into Cellwest. R. 2370. 
Zieglowsky collected rents and made payments for one 
year. R. 2371. The State did not include an accounting of the 
amount collected in rent or the amount of the principal paid off 
during that one-year period. The State further proffered that 
Zieglowsky "walked away" from the property after that one-year 
period and assumed that Tenney would collect rents and make 
payments on the property. R. 2371. Tenney proffered that he did 
not have title or physical possession of the property and 
indicated that perhaps Zieglowsky simply "walked away" and was 
responsible for any subsequent foreclosure proceedings. R. 2379. 
The State proffered that Zieglowsky subsequently learned 
that the bank was foreclosing on the property, and paid $6,000 to 
redeem the property. R. 2371. The trial judge determined that 
Tenney must pay the $6,000 plus the difference between the 
$46,700 value of the property in 1988 and the $27,000 lien on the 
property at that time. R. 2372, 2502-03. 
The State proffered that the second piece of property was 
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valued at $42,800, with an indebtedness of $29,400 when it was 
transferred to Tenney. R. 2368. The State also proffered that 
"that property was lost." R. 2373. The trial judge required 
Tenney to pay restitution in the amount of $13,400 for that 
property. R. 2373. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201(4) (a) provides in pertinent 
part: 
When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has 
resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other 
sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the 
defendant make restitution up to double the amount of 
pecuniary damages to the victim or victims of the offense 
of which the defendant has been convicted, or to the 
victim of any other criminal conduct admitted by the 
defendant to the sentencing court. 
In Robinson, 860 P.2d at 982, this Court considered the 
impact of due process concerns on restitution awards. This Court 
recognized: 
"The demands of due process rest on the concept of basic 
fairness of procedure and demand a procedure appropriate 
to the case and just to the parties involved." Holm v. 
Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157, 164 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting 
Wiscombe v. Wiscombe, 644 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Utah App. 
1987) (quoting Rupp v. Grantsvilie City, 610 P.2d 338, 
341 (Utah 1980). "One of the fundamental requisites of 
due process is the opportunity to be fully heard." Id. 
(quoting Wiscombe, 744 P.2d at 1025). 
The Robinson court analyzed whether restitution is proper 
in traffic cases which involve negligence. The court held that 
restitution is not appropriate in such cases because the 
defendant is deprived of property without an opportunity to be 
fully heard. Robinson, 982 P.2d at 982. The court pointed out 
that the issues of fault, proximate cause and amount of damages 
are a crucial part of civil litigation where a traffic accident 
occurs, and that "[m]atters of negligence, proximate cause and 
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the amount of resulting damages are best left to civil 
litigation." Robinson, 860 P.2d at 983. The court held that 
restitution was improperly awarded in that case which arose from 
a "traffic violation that involve[d] only negligence, and not 
criminal intent." Id. 
The present case arose from a criminal matter which 
involved only "willfulness" and not specific intent to defraud or 
sell unregistered securities. In addition, the amount of damages 
which James Zieglowsky sustained involves a complex question 
which would be better left to civil litigation. 
As can be seen from the proffers, Appellant did not have 
an opportunity to be fully heard and the trial judge did not 
receive sufficient evidence to accurately calculate the damages 
in this case. No evidence was presented as to the amount 
Zieglowsky collected in rents from the first property or the 
amount made in payments on that property during the first year 
after the property was refinanced. Any excess rent which may 
have existed and gone to Zieglowsky and any decrease in principal 
during that year were not taken into account in figuring the 
damages sustained by Zieglowsky. 
Nor did the judge fully explore the question of whether 
Zieglowsky was responsible for either property becoming subject 
to foreclosure. Determining the appropriate amount of damages 
in a case such as this would have been better left to civil 
litigation. As was the case in Robinson, Tenney did not have an 
opportunity to be fully heard on the matter of restitution to 
Zieglowsky. The trial court erred in ordering that Tenney pay 
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$39,000 in restitution to Mr. Zieglowsky. 
REASONS FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND WRITTEN OPINION 
This appeal raises a number of complex issues which 
involve areas of the law requiring further development. 
Point I addresses, among other things, the issue of 
whether improper remarks made by the prosecutor during opening 
statement require reversal only if they are made in "bad faith" 
and, if so, what constitutes "bad faith." See Lafferty, 749 P.2d 
at 1255 n.13. Point II raises the issue of whether testimony by 
the State's expert witnesses which goes beyond the limits 
enunciated in Larsen II, 865 P.2d at 1355, requires reversal 
under a plain error analysis. Point III addresses the adequacy 
of various elements instructions under to the Uniform Securities 
Act and requires this Court to consider the responsibility of the 
trial judge to adequately instruct the jury as to all elements 
and legal concepts stated in the instructions. See Dunn, 850 
P.2d at 1209. This issue also raises, among other things, the 
question of the circumstances under which the failure to require 
jury unanimity as to the act constitutes plain error, and allows 
this Court to refine its decision in Saunders, 259 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 24. Point IV raises the issue of what constitutes an 
adequate colloquy where a criminal defendant indicates that he 
would like to represent himself. See Bakalov I and Bakalov II. 
Point V addresses the issue of prejudice where a juror has 
improper contact during the course of a trial. Point VI raises 
an issue as to the appropriateness of restitution where the 
ascertainment of the amount of damages involves a complex 
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question which would be more fairly litigated in a civil 
proceeding, and asks this Court to extend the holding of 
Robinson, 860 P.2d at 982, beyond traffic cases. 
The number of issues raised, along with their complexity, 
require both oral argument and a written opinion. Because many 
of the issues raised ask this Court to refine previous decisions 
or further develop specific areas of law, a written opinion and 
oral argument are requested. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that all counts be 
reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this '/ day of July, 1995. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Text ot Statutes, Kules and Constitutional Provisions 
61-1-1. Fraud unlawful. 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase 
of any security, directly or indirectly to: 
(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or 
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
61-1-3. Licensing of broker-dealers, agents, and invest-
ment advisers. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to transact business in this state as a 
broker-dealer or agent unless the person is licensed under this chapter. 
(2) (a) It is unlawful for any broker-dealer or issuer to employ or engage an 
agent unless the agent is licensed. The license of an agent is not effective 
during any period when he is not associated with a particular broker-
dealer licensed under this chapter or a particular issuer. 
(b) When an agent begins or terminates a connection with a broker-
dealer or issuer, or begins or terminates those activities which make him 
an agent, the agent as well as the broker-dealer or issuer shall promptly 
notify the division. 
(3) It is unlawful for any person to transact business in this state as an 
investment adviser or as an investment adviser representative unless: 
(a) the person is licensed under this chapter; or 
(b) the person's only clients in this state are investment companies as 
defined in the Investment Company Act of 1940, other investment ad-
visers, broker-dealers, banks, trust companies, savings and loan associa-
tions, insurance companies, employee benefit plans with assets of not less 
than $1,000,000, and governmental agencies or instrumentalities, 
whether acting for themselves or as trustees with investment control, or 
other institutional investors as are designated by rule or order of the 
director; or 
(c) the person has no place of business in this state and during any 
period of 12 consecutive months does not direct business communications 
in this state in any manner to more than five clients, other than those 
specified in Subsection (b), whether or not the person or any of those to 
whom the communications are directed is then present in this state. 
(4) (a) It is unlawful for any investment adviser required to be licensed to 
employ an investment adviser representative unless the investment ad-
viser representative is licensed under this chapter. 
(b) The license of an investment adviser representative is effective dur-
ing the period when the person is employed by an investment adviser 
licensed under this chapter. 
(c) When an investment adviser representative begins or terminates 
employment with an investment adviser, both the investment adviser 
and the investment adviser representative shall promptly notify the divi-
sion. 
61-1-7. Registration before sale. 
It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in this state unless 
it is registered under this chapter or the security or transaction is exempted 
under Section 61-1-14. 
61-1-13. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(2) "Agent" means any individual other than a broker-dealer who rep-
resents a broker-dealer or issuer in effecting or attempting to effect pur-
chases or sales of securities. "Agent" does not include an individual who 
represents an issuer, who receives no commission or other remuneration, 
directly or indirectly, for effecting or attempting to effect purchases or 
sales of securities in this state, and who: 
(a) effects transactions in securities exempted by Subsection 
61-l-14(l)(a), (b), (c), (i), or (j); 
(b) effects transactions exempted by Subsection 61-1-14(2); or 
(c) effects transactions with existing employees, partners, officers, 
or directors of the issuer. A partner, officer, or director of a broker-
dealer or issuer, or a person occupying a similar status or performing 
similar functions, is an agent only if he otherwise comes within this 
definition. 
61-1-13. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(3) "Broker-dealer" means any person engaged in the business of effect-
ing transactions in securities for the account of others or for his own 
account. "Broker-dealer" does not include: 
(a) an agent; 
(b) an issuer; 
(c) a bank, savings institution, or trust company; 
(d) a person who has no place of business in this state if: 
(i) the person effects transactions in this state exclusively with 
or through: 
(A) the issuers of the securities involved in the transac-
tions; 
(B) other broker-dealers; or 
(C) banks, savings institutions, trust companies, insur-
ance companies, investment companies as defined in the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940, pension or profit-sharing 
trusts, or other financial institutions or institutional buyers, 
whether acting for themselves or as trustees; or 
(ii) during any period of 12 consecutive months the person 
does not direct more than 15 offers to sell or buy into this state in 
any manner to persons other than those specified in Subsection 
(3)(d)(i), whether or not the offeror or any of the offerees is then 
present in this state; 
(e) a general partner who organizes and effects transactions in 
securities of three or fewer limited partnerships, of which the person 
is the general partner, in any period of 12 consecutive months; 
(f) a person whose participation in transactions in securities is 
confined to those transactions made by or through a broker-dealer 
licensed in this state; 
(g) a person who is a real estate broker licensed in this state and 
who effects transactions in a bond or other evidence of indebtedness 
secured by a real or chattel mortgage or deed of trust, or by an agree-
ment for the sale of real estate or chattels, if the entire mortgage, 
deed or trust, or agreement, together with all the bonds or other 
evidences of indebtedness secured thereby, is offered and sold as a 
unit; 
(h) a person effecting transactions in commodity contracts or com-
modity options; or 
(i) other persons as the division, by rule or order, may designate, 
consistent with the public interest and protection of investors, as not 
within the intent of this subsection. 
61-1-14. Exemptions. 
(1) The following securities are exempted from Sections 61-1-7 and 61-1-15: 
(a) any security, including a revenue obligation, issued or guaranteed 
by the United States, any state, any political subdivision of a state, or any 
agency or corporate or other instrumentality of one or more of the forego-
ing, or any certificate of deposit for any of the foregoing; 
(b) any security issued or guaranteed by Canada, any Canadian prov-
ince, any political subdivision of any Canadian province, any agency or 
corporate or other instrumentality of one or more of the foregoing, or any 
other foreign government with which the United States currently main-
tains diplomatic relations, if the security is recognized as a valid obliga-
tion by the issuer or guarantor; 
(c) any security issued by and representing an interest in or a debt of, 
or guaranteed by, any bank organized under the laws of the United 
States, or any bank, savings institution, or trust company supervised 
under the laws of any state; 
(d) any security issued by and representing an interest in or a debt of, 
or guaranteed by, any federal savings and loan association, or any build-
ing and loan or similar association organized under the laws of any state 
and authorized to do business in this state; 
(e) any security issued or guaranteed by any federal credit union or 
any credit union, industrial loan association, or similar association orga-
nized and supervised under the laws of this state; 
(f) any security issued or guaranteed by any railroad, other common 
carrier, public utility, or holding company which is subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the interstate commerce commission, a registered holding com-
pany under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or a subsid-
iary of such a company within the meaning of that act, or any security 
regulated in respect of its rates or in its issuance by a governmental 
authority of the United States, any state, Canada, or any Canadian prov-
ince; 
(g)
 a i ly security listed on the National Association of Securities 
Dealers Automated Quotation System, the New York Stock Exchange, 
the American Stock Exchange, or on any other stock exchange or medium 
approved by the division, except that the director may at any time sus-
pend or revoke this exemption for any particular stock exchange, me-
dium, security, or securities under Subsection 61-1-14(4); any other secu-
rity of the same issuer which is of senior or substantially equal rank to 
any security so listed and approved by the director, any security called for 
by subscription rights or warrants so listed or approved, or any warrant 
or right to purchase or subscribe to any of the foregoing; 
(h) (i) any security issued by any person organized and operated not for 
private profit but exclusively for religious, educational, benevolent, 
charitable, fraternal, social, athletic, or reformatory purposes, or as a 
chamber of commerce or trade or professional association; and 
(ii) any security issued by a corporation organized under Title 3, 
Chapter 1, and any security issued by a corporation to which the 
provisions of that chapter are made applicable by compliance with 
the requirements of Section 3-1-21; 
(i) a promissory note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance 
that evidences an obligation to pay cash within nine months after the 
date of issuance, exclusive of days of grace, or a renewal of such an obliga-
tion that is likewise limited, or a guarantee of such an obligation or of a 
renewal: 
(i) issued 
(ii) either: 
(A) receives a rating in one of the three highest rating catego-
ries from a nationally recognized statistical rating organization; 
or 
(B) the issuer satisfies requirements esLililisInnl in Ii 
order of the division; 
(j) any investment contract issued in connection with an employees' 
stock purchase, savings, pension, profit-sharing, or similar benefit plan; 
(k) a security issued by an issuer registered as an open-end manage-
ment investment company or unit investment trust under Section. 8 of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, if: 
(i) (A) the issuer is advised by an investment adviser that is a 
depository institution exempt from registration under the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940 or that is currently registered as an 
investment adviser, and has been registered, or is affiliated with 
an adviser that has been registered, as an investment adviser 
under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 for at least three 
years next preceding an offer or sale of a security claimed to be 
exempt under this subsection; and 
(B) the adviser has acted, or is affiliated with an investment 
adviser that has acted as investment adviser to one or more 
registered investment companies or unit investment trusts for at 
least three years next preceding an offer or sale of a security 
claimed to be exempt under this subsection; or 
(ii) the issuer has a sponsor that has at all times throughout the 
three years before an offer or sale of a security claimed to be exempt 
under this subsection sponsored one or more registered investment 
companies or unit investment trusts the aggregate total assets of 
which have exceeded $100,000,000; 
(hi) in addition to Subsection (i) or (ii), the division has received 
prior to any sale exempted herein: 
(A) a notice of intention to sell which has been executed by the 
issuer which sets forth the name and address of the issuer and 
the title of the securities to be offered in this state; and 
(B) a filing fee as determined under Section 61-1-18.4; 
(iv) in the event any offer or sale of a security of an open-end 
management investment company is to be made more than 12 
months after the date on which the notice and fee under Subsection 
(iii) is received by the director, another notice and payment of the 
applicable fee shall be required. 
(v) For the purpose of this subsection, an investment adviser is 
affiliated with another investment adviser if it controls, is controlled 
by, or is under common control with the other investment adviser; 
(1) any security as to which the director, by rule or order, finds that 
registration is not necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors. 
(2) The following transactions are exempted from Sections 61-1-7 and 
61-1-15: 
(a) any isolated transaction, whether effected through a broker-dealer 
or not; 
(b) any nonissuer transaction in an outstanding security, if as provided 
by rule of the division: 
(i) information about the issuer of the security as required by the 
division is currently listed in a securities manual recognized by the 
division, and the listing is based upon such information as required 
by rule of the division; or 
(ii) the security has a fixed maturity or a fixed interest or dividend 
provision and there has been no default during the current fiscal year 
or within the three preceding fiscal years, or during the existence of 
the issuer and any predecessors if less than three years, in the pay-
ment of principal, interest, or dividends on the security; 
(c) any nonissuer transaction effected by or through a registered bro-
ker-dealer pursuant to an unsolicited order or offer to buy; 
(d) any transaction between the issuer or other person on whose behalf 
the offering is made and an underwriter, or among underwriters; 
(e) any transaction in a bond or other evidence of indebtedness secured 
by a real or chattel mortgage or deed of trust, or by an agreement for the 
sale of real estate or chattels, if the entire mortgage, deed of trust, or 
agreement, together with all the bonds or other evidences of indebtedness 
secured thereby, is offered and sold as a unit; 
(f) any transaction by an executor, administrator, sheriff, marshal, re-
ceiver, trustee in bankruptcy, guardian, or conservator; 
(g) any transaction executed by a bona fide pledgee without any pur-
pose of evading this chapter; 
(h) any offer or sale to a bank, savings institution, trust company, 
insurance company, investment company as defined in the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, pension or profit-sharing trust, or other financial 
institution or institutional buyer, or to a broker-dealer, whether the pur-
chaser is acting for itself or in some fiduciary capacity; 
(il any offer or sale of a preorganization certificate or subscription if: 
(i) no commission or other remuneration is paid or given directly 
or indirectly for soliciting any prospective subscriber; 
(ii) the number of subscribers acquiring any legal or beneficial 
interest therein does not exceed ten; and 
(iii) there is no general advertising or solicitation in connection 
with the offer or sale; 
(j) any transaction pursuant to an offer by an issuer of its securities to 
its existing securities holders, if; 
(i) no commission or other remuneration, other than a standby 
commission is paid or given directly or indirectly for soliciting any 
security holders in this state and the transaction constitutes either: 
(A) the conversion of convertible securities; 
(B) the exercise of nontransferable rights or warrants; 
(C) the exercise of transferable rights or warrants if the rights 
or warrants are exercisable not more than 90 days after their 
issuance; or 
(D) the purchase of securities under a preemptive right; and 
(ii) the exemption created by Subsection (2)(j) is not available for 
an offer or sale of securities to existing securities holders who have 
acquired their securities from the issuer in a transaction in violation 
of Section 61-1-7; 
(k) any offer, but not a sale, of a security for which registration state-
ments have been filed under both this chapter and the Securities Act of 
1933 if no stop order or refusal order is in effect and no public proceeding 
or examination looking toward such an order is pending; 
(1) a distribution of securities as a dividend if the person distributing 
the dividend is the issuer of the securities distributed; 
(m) any nonissuer transaction effected by or through a registered bro-
ker-dealer where the broker-dealer or issuer files with the division, and 
the broker-dealer maintains in his records, and makes reasonably avail-
able upon request to any person expressing an interest in a proposed 
transaction in the security with the broker-dealer information prescribed 
by the division under its rules; 
(n) any transactions not involving a public offering 
(o) any offer or sale of "condominium units" or "time period units" as 
those terms are defined in the Condominium Ownership Act, whether or 
not to be sold by installment contract, if the provisions of the Condomin-
ium Ownership Act, or if the units are located in another state, the condo-
minium act of that state, the Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices Act, the 
Utah Timeshare and Camp Resort Act, and the Utah Uniform Consumer 
Credit Code are complied with; 
(p) any transaction or series of transactions involving a merger, consol-
idation, reorganization, recapitalization, reclassification, or sale of assets, 
if the consideration for which, in whole or in part, is the issuance of 
securities of a person or persons, and if: 
(i) the transaction or series of transactions is incident to a vote of 
the securities holders of each person involved or by written consent or 
resolution of some or all of the securities holders of each person in-
volved; 
(ii) the vote, consent, or resolution is given under j provision in. 
(A) the applicable corporate statute or other controlling stat-
ute; 
(B) the controlling articles of incorporation, trust indenture, 
deed of trust, or partnership agreement; or 
(C) the controlling agreement among securities holders; 
(iii) (A) one person involved in the transaction is required to file 
proxy or informational materials under Section 14(a) or (c) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or Section 20 of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 and has so filed; 
(B) one person involved in the transaction is an insurance 
company which is exempt from filing under Section 12(g)(2)(G) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and has filed proxy or infor-
mational materials with the appropriate regulatory agency or 
official of its domiciliary state; or 
(C) all persons involved in the transaction are exempt from 
filing under Section 12(g)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, and file with the division such proxy or informational ma-
terial as the division requires by rule; 
(iv) the proxy or informational material is filed with the division 
and distributed to all securities holders entitled to vote in the trans-
action or series of transactions at least ten working days prior to any 
necessary vote by the securities holders or action on any necessary 
consent or resolution; and 
(v) the division does not, by order, deny or revoke the exemption 
within ten working days after filing of the proxy or informational 
materials; 
(q) any transaction pursuant to an offer to sell securities of an issuer if: 
(i) the transaction is part of an issue in which there are not more 
than 15 purchasers in this state, other than those designated in Sub-
section (2)(h), during any 12 consecutive months; 
(ii) no general solicitation or general advertising is used in connec-
tion with the offer to sell or sale of the securities; 
(iii) no commission or other similar compensation is given, directly 
or indirectly, to a person other than a broker-dealer or agent licensed 
under this chapter, for soliciting a prospective purchaser in this state; 
(iv) the seller reasonably believes that all the purchasers in this 
state are purchasing for investment; 
(v) the transaction is part of an aggregate offering that does not 
exceed $500,000, or a greater amount as prescribed by a division rule, 
during any 12 consecutive months; and 
(vi) the director, as to a security or transaction, or a type of secu-
rity or transaction, may withdraw or further condition this exemp-
tion or waive one or more of the conditions in Subsection (q); 
(r) any transaction involving a commodity contract or commodity op-
tion; and 
(s) any transaction as to which the division finds that registration is 
not necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors. 
(3) Every person filing an exemption notice or application shall pay a filing 
fee as determined under Section 61-1-18.4. 
(4) Upon approval by a majority of the Securities Advisory Board, the direc-
tor, by means of an adjudicative proceeding conducted in accordance with 
Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, may deny or revoke 
any exemption specified in Subsection (l)(g), (h), or (j) or in Subsection (2) 
with respect to: 
(a) a specific security, transaction, or series of transactions; or 
(b) any person or issuer, any affiliate or successor to a person or issuer, 
or any entity subsequently organized by or on behalf of a person or issuer 
generally and may impose a fine if he finds that the order is in the public 
interest and that: 
(i) the application for or notice of exemption filed with the division 
is incomplete in any material respect or contains any statement 
which was, in the light of the circumstances under which it was 
made, false or misleading with respect to any material fact; 
(ii) any provision of this chapter, or any rule, order, or condition 
lawfully imposed under this chapter has been willfully violated in 
connection with the offering or exemption by: 
(A) the person filing any application for or notice of exemp 
tion; 
(Bj the issuer, any partner, officer, or director of the issuer, 
any person occupying a similar status or performing similar 
functions, or any person directly or indirectly controlling or con-
trolled by the issuer, but only if the person filing the application 
for or notice of exemption is directly or indirectly controlled by or 
acting for the issuer; or 
(C) any underwriter; 
(iii) the security for which the exemption is sought is the subject of 
an administrative stop order or similar order, or a permanent or 
temporary injunction or any court of competent jurisdiction entered 
under any other federal or state act applicable to the offering or 
exemption; the division may not institute a proceeding against an 
effective exemption under this subsection more than one year from 
the date of the order or injunction relied on, and it may not enter an 
order under this subsection on the basis of an order or injunction 
entered under any other state act unless that order or injunction was 
based on facts that would currently constitute a ground for a stop 
order under this section; 
(iv) the issuer's enterprise or method of business incluc 
include activities that are illegal where performed; 
(v) the offering has worked, has tended to work, or would operate 
to work a fraud upon purchasers; 
(vi) the offering has been or was made with unreasonable amounts 
of underwriters' and sellers' discounts, commissions, or other compen-
sation, or promoters' profits or participation, or unreasonable 
amounts or kinds of options; 
(vii) an exemption is sought "for a security or transaction which is 
not eligible for the exemption; or 
(viii) the proper filing fee, if required, has not been paid. 
(5) (a) No order under Subsection (4) may operate retroactively. 
(b) No person may be considered to have violated Section 61-1-7 or 
61-1-15 by reason of any offer or sale effected after the entry of an order 
under this subsection if he sustains the burden of proof that he did not 
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the 
order 
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed 
— Definitions — Civil penalties — Restitution — 
Hearing — Aggravation or mitigation of crimes 
with mandatory sentences — Resentencing. 
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted 
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution up 
to double the amount of pecuniary damages to the victim or victims of 
the offense of which the defendant has been convicted, or to the victim 
of any other criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the 
sentencing court. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4Xc). 
Rule 17. The trial. 
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate 
or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty 
not to converse among themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to 
be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is 
their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally 
submitted to them. 
Rule 702. Testimony by experts. 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Rule 704. Opinion on ultimate issue. 
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), testimony in the form of an 
opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it em-
braces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. 
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condi-
tion of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to 
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition 
constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such 
ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN B. TENNEY 
DOB: May 6, 1940 
SSN: 527-58-1361 
Defendant. 
The undersigned, Michael E. Hines, states on 
information and belief that the defendant, JOHN B. TENNEY, 
committed the following crimes: 
OFFERING OR SELLING UNREGISTERED SECURITIES, 13 COUNTS 
SECURITIES FRAUD, 13 COUNTS 
UNREGISTERED SECURITIES BROKER-DEALER OR SALES AGENT, 1 COUNT 
EMPLOYING UNREGISTERED AGENTS, 2 COUNTS 
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COUNTS 1 THROUGH 13 
OFFERING OR SELLING UNREGISTERED SECURITIES 
On or about July 29, 1986, to at least December 10, 
1988, in Salt Lake County and elsewhere in the state of Utah, in 
violation of the Section 61-1-7 of the Utah Uniform Securities 
Act,1 defendant JOHN B. TENNEY, directly or indirectly, through 
agents, willfully offered or sold securities without registration 
under the Utah Uniform Securities Act when no exemption from 
registration was available, to the following investors, among 
others, on or about the following dates in the following amounts: 
Investor 
Count 1. Gerald Berg 
Count 2. Jeffrey Stout 
Count 3. David Baker 
Count 4. John Cawley 
Count 5. Ronald Frost 
Count 6. David Ingraham 
Count 7. Kristy and 
Phillip Holmes 
Count 8. Dale and Shirley 
Panting 
Amount 
$ 20,000 
$ 3,000 
$ 5,000 
$ 8,000 
$ 10,000 
$ 2,500 
$ 500 
$ 5,950 
Date 
April 27, 1987 
May 26, 1987 
August 14, 1987 
August 25, 1987 
October 8, 1987 
October 7, 1987 
October 19, 1987 
January 15, 1988 
1
 The Utah Uniform Securities Act is set forth at Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 through 61-1-30 (1986). 
2 
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Count 9. Jeffrey Ulibarri $ 1,000 
Count 10. Richard Ulibarri $ 3,000 
Count 11. Rocky Ulibarri $ 1,000 
Count 12. James Zieglowsky $133,000 
Count 13. Marlene Peterson $ 2,000 
January 20, 1988 
January 20, 1988 
January 22, 1988 
May 13, 1988 
July 20, 1988 
These violations of law are unclassified felonies under Section 
61-1-21 of the Utah Uniform Securities Act. 
COUNTS 14 THROUGH 26 
SECURITIES FRAUD 
On or about July 29, 1986, through at least December 
10, 1988, in the state of Utah, in violation of Section 61-1-1 of 
the Utah Uniform Securities Act, defendant JOHN B. TENNEY, in 
connection with the offer or sale of securities, directly or 
indirectly, willfully: (1) employed a device, scheme or artifice 
to defraud; or (2) made an untrue statement of material fact or 
omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading; or (3) engaged in an act, 
practice or course of business which operated or would operate as 
a fraud or deceit upon the following investors, among others, on 
or about the following dates: 
3 
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Count 14, 
Count 15, 
Count 16, 
Count 17-
Count 18, 
Count 19, 
Count 20, 
Count 21. 
Count 22. 
Count 23, 
Count 24, 
Count 25-
Count 26. 
Investor 
Gerald Berg 
Jeffrey Stout 
David Baker 
John Cawley 
Ronald Frost 
David Ingraham 
Kristy and 
Phillip Holmes 
Dale and Shirley 
Panting 
Jeffrey Ulibarri 
Richard Ulibarri 
Rocky Ulibarri 
James Zieglowsky 
Marlene Peterson 
Date 
April 27, 1987 
May 26, 1987 
August 14, 1987 
August 25, 1987 
October 8, 1987 
October 7, 1987 
October 19, 1987 
January 15, 1988 
January 20, 1988 
January 20, 1988 
January 22, 1988 
May 13, 1988 
July 20, 1988 
These violations of law are unclassified felonies under Section 
61-1-21 of the Utah Uniform Securities Act. 
UU1JJ 
COUNT 27 
UNREGISTERED SECURITIES BROKER-DEALER OR SALES AGENT 
From on or about July 29, 1986, through at least 
December 10, 1988, in the state of Utah, defendant JOHN B. TENNEY 
engaged in violations of Section 61-1-3 of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act by willfully transacting business in Utah as a 
broker-dealer or agent without being licensed as such with the 
Utah Division of Securities. This violation of law is an 
unclassified felony under Section 61-1-21 of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act. 
COUNTS 28 THROUGH 29 
EMPLOYING UNREGISTERED AGENTS 
From at least April 27, 1987 through at least January 
22, 1988, in the state of Utah, defendant JOHN B. TENNEY engaged 
in violations of Section 61-1-3(2) of the Utah Uniform Securities 
Act by willfully employing the following persons, among others, 
as unregistered agents in the offer or sale of securities to the 
investors listed above: 
Count 28. Steven Rick Jensen 
Count 29. Steven Bowers 
5 
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These violations of law are unclassified felonies under Section 
61-1-21 of the Utah Uniform Securities Act. 
This Information is based upon evidence from witnesses 
listed in the Affidavit of Probable Cause. j 
Authorized for presentment and filing this 
yy\a^fiJ^ , 1993. 
day o f 
R^^MHi=3ZAN~ESM 
A t t o r n e y General 
By: :<^ <o 
LYNN NICHOLAS 
Assistant Attorney General 
DATED this 3 t-cf day of 1993 
Affia! 
Michael E. Hines appeared before me this day of 
j 1993 , and attested that the foregoing 
information is true to the best of his knowledge, information and 
belief. 
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ADDENDUM C 
Judgment 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OFJJTAH 
JUL 29 4i#fH r93 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
to ^ A ! j t f&JMENT, SENTENCE 
Plaintiff,
 v
 BT
 *=•" ^ f r ^ , j / ^ M j f l M M I T M E N T ) 
vs. I Case No. Q 3 i Q m n « i f i 
r.n.,ntMn 1 •? 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 . R. Q. 1 0 , 1 
TENNEY, JOHN B. ^ Hnnnrahte Tyrone E. Medley 1 
Clerk S . H e n s l e y 
Reporter P . T r i p p 
Bailiff P . B i v p r s 
Defendant Date J u l y 2 6 , 1993 
D The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is • granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by & x jury; • the court-D plea of .guilty' 
D plea of no contest; of the offense of o f f e r i n g o r s e l l i n g u n r e g i s t e r e d s T e c u r ^ i e ^ s 
of the degree, D a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by p r o RP , and the State being represented by C. B a r l o w is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
x not to exceed three years 
u to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed five years; 
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ ; 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
x
 Counts 15, 17, 18 and 27 to be served consecuhivply 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
D such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, • Court, Count(s) are hereby dismissed. 
D 
Q£ Defendant is granted a stay of the above (Ocprison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of 72 m o n t h s pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
D Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
D Commitment shall issue 
DATED this 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
Plaintiff, (COMMITMENT) 
vs. I Case No. 921901056 
TENNEY, JOHN B. \ Count No 14, 1 5 , 11, 18
 f 19 f 20 f 21, 2 
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley 2 3 , 2 
Clerk S. Hens ley 2 5 , 2 
Reporter D- Tripp 
Bailiff R. R ivers 
Defendant. ' Date J u l y 26
 y 1993 
D The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by Oca jury; D the court; D plea of guilty; 
D plea of no contest; of the offense of s e c u r i t i e s fraud
 t a felony 
of the degree, D a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by P r o s e , and the State being represented by C. B a r l o w is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
x not to exceed three years 
D to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed five years; 
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ ; 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
x Counts 15, 17, 18 and 27 to be served consecutively 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
D such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of • State, D Defense, • Court, Count(s) are hereby dismissed. 
D 
£1 Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( g prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of 72 m o n t h s pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
D Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
D Commitment shall issue 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
Plaintiff.
 v (COMMITMENT) 
921901056 
vs. I Case No. 
TENNEY, JOHN B. \ ^cunt N^ ^ r o n f t E . M e d l ^ 
Clerk S. Hensley 
Reporter D- Tripp 
Bailiff R. Rivers 
Defendant. n a t A J u l y 26 , 1993 
D The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by I j a jury; D the court; D plea of guilty;
 t 
D plea of no contest; of the offense of u n r e g i s t e r e d s e c u r i t i e s b r o k e r o r s a l ^ A f i g ^ n r 
of the degree, D a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by p-rn RP and the State being represented by C . B a r l o w j S now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
x not to exceed three years 
D to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be for life; 
• not to exceed five years; 
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
• not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ ; 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
x Counts 15, 17, 18 and 27 to be served consecutively 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
• such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s) are hereby dismissed. 
D 
B Defendant is granted a stay of the above (H prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of 72 m o n t h s
 t pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
D Defendant is remanded intothecustodyoftheSheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
D Commitment shall issue 
DATED this 2 6 t h da 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
Plaintiff. (COMMITMENT) 
J Case No. 9 2 1 9 0 1 0 5 6 
TENNEY, JOHN B. f Count No. 2 8 ' 2 9 
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley 
Clerk S. Hens ley 
Reporter g - g r i P P 
Bailiff R. Rivers 
Defendant ' Date J u l y 26 , 1993 
D The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by B a jury; D the court; D plea of guilty; 
D plea of no contest; of the offense of employing u n r e g i s t e r e d a g e n t s 
, a felony 
of the degree, D a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by p r o se , and the State being represented hy C. B a r l o w is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
x not to exceed three years 
D to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed five years; 
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ ; 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
x Counts 15, 17, 18 and 27 to be served consecutively 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
• such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, • Court, Count(s) are hereby dismissed. 
D 
a Defendant is granted a stay of the above $Ekprison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of m o n t n s pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
• Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
D Commitment shall issue 
DATED t h i s 2 6 t h 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney 
921901056
 m „ M , . 
Judgment/State v. TENNEY, JOHN B ,
 / C R /Honorable _Tyron^E. Medle 
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION 
D Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Dept. of Adult Probation & Parole. 
B Serve one y e a r 
in the Salt Lake County Jail commencing f o r t h w i t h 
D Pay a fine in the amount of $ D at a rate to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole; or D at the rate of 
H Pay restitution in the amount of $ ; or Cjkin an amount to be determined by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole; D at a rate of ; or • at a rate to be determined by 
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
• Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or treatment as 
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Enter, participate in, and complete the program at 
D Participate in and complete any • educational; and/or • vocational training D as directed by the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or D with 
D Participate in and complete any training D as directed by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole; or • with 
D Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs. 
D Submit to drug testing. 
D Not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distrubutes narcotics or drugs. 
• Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally. 
D Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances. 
D Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
D Submit to testing for alcohol use. 
D Take antabuse D as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment. 
D Maintain full-time employment. 
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment or full-time schooling. 
D Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling. 
D Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with 
D Defendant's probation may be transferred to under the Interstate Compact as approved 
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
a Complete lOOOhnurs of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation 
and Parole. 
D Complete hours of community service restitution in lieu of days in jail. 
a Defendant is to commit no crimes. 
D Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on for a review of this sentence. 
(3 Become full-time employed except for selling securities, 
g; Defendant to obtain any mental health counseling recommended by AP&P, 
IX Defendant to be supervised by I.S.P. 
D 
D 
D 
DATED this 
Page 
ADDENDUM D 
Motion for New Trial, Memorandum and Affidavits 
JOHN B. TENNEY , , , , . _ _ 
Prose JUL 2 6 1993 
8415 Kings Hill Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
 0 SALTLAKBCOUNIY 
Telephone: (801) 942-8144 BySs»«Sc4fiacuiU^  
/ j Oopuy Cteik 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOHN B. TENNEY 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 921901056FS 
JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, the defendant, JOHN B. TENNEY, hereby moves this Court 
for an order granting the defendant a new trial in the above-
referenced case. This motion is based on the ground of impropriety 
on the part of Dr. Richard L. Barnett, a juror, which impropriety 
had a substantial adverse affect upon the rights of the defendant. 
The grounds for this motion are more fully set forth in a 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for a New Trial and Affidavit of 
Richard D. Christensen. 
DATED this J?/A day of July, 1993. 
JOHN B. TENNEY 7) 
Pro Se 
CC778 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to Charlene 
Barlow, Assistant Attorney General Office, 111 State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this p77#-day of July, 1993, 
CO 7 7 
JOHN B. TENNEY 
Pro Se 
8415 Kings Hill Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone: (801) 942-8144 
Third Juciicsai District 
JUL 2 6 1993 
SAuTLAKECOJl-i'fY 
Avcpuy Cisrk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, : 
v. 
JOHN B. TENNEY, 
Defendant. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
: Case No. 921901056FS 
JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
I. Background 
On June 1, 1993, a jury of eight persons rendered a 
verdict against John B. Tenney on twenty-seven counts of 
selling unregistered securities, securities fraud, employing 
unlicensed agents, and acting as an unlicensed broker-dealer. 
The trial was held in Third District Court in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, the Honorable Judge Tyrone Medley presiding. 
Dr. Richard Barnett, an orthodonist with offices in 
Salt Lake City and West Valley served as a member of the jury. 
Some weeks after the verdict in the above case, Lynda Tenney, 
wife of John Tenney ("Tenney"), was in the West Valley dental 
office of Dr. Richard Christensen to have some dental work 
done and overheard comments about statements which Dr. Barnett 
had made to persons in the dental clinic during the course of 
of the trial. 
On July 26, 1993, Tenney filed a Motion for a New Trial, 
This motion is accompanied by Affidavits of two persons with 
whom Dr. Barnett discussed the case and to whom he made state-
ments which indicated that he had a strong prejudicial bias 
against Tenney, and which made it impossible for Dr. Barnett 
to render a fair and impartial decision in this case. These 
discussions were had and the prejudicial statements were made 
before all of the evidence was presented in the case. 
This Brief reviews several issues and cites legal refer-
ences which show why Tenney1s motion should be granted by the 
Court. 
II. Grounds For a New Trial 
The Motion for a New Trial was filed pursuant to Rule 24 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Practice statutes and rules of practice enumerate as one 
of the grounds of new trial misconduct of the jury which 
affects the substantial rights of the defendant and prevents 
a fair and impartial trial. Carpenter v. Union Banking Co,, 
67 S.D. 151, 290 N.W. 322. Newman v. State, 91 Tex. Crim. 559, 
240 S.W. 312. 
Misconduct of the jury, when of a prejudicial character 
or such as to warrant the belief that the fairness and propriety 
of the trial have been affected and impaired, that injury has 
resulted therefrom, is a proper cause for a new trial. 
Emporia v. Juengling, 78 Kan. 595, 96 P. 850. 
G0783 
Where prejudice has, or probably has, resulted to an 
unsuccessful party from jury misconduct, that party is entitled 
to a new trial provided he or she was without fault in bringing 
the misconduct. People v. Stokes, 103 Cal. 193, 37 P. 207; 
Jones v. People, 6 Colo. 452; Pettibone v. Phelps, 13 Conn. 
445; State v. Shaw, 79 Kan. 396, 100 P. 78; Commonwealth v. 
Tucker, 189 Mass. 457, 76 N.E. 127; Blodgett v. Park, 76 N.H. 
435, 84 A. 42; State v. Robidon, 20 N.D. 518, 128 N.W. 1124; 
White Cabs v. Moore, 146 Tex. 101, 203 S.W.2d 200; St. Louis 
S.W.R. Co. v. Robinson (Tex. Comm. App.) 285 S.W. 269, 46 
A.l.r. 1507; McDaniels v. McDaniels, 40 VT. 363; State v. 
Wilson, 42 Wash. 56, 84 P. 409. 
One court has taken the position that where a statute 
prescribing the grounds for a new trial includes the ground, 
"misconduct of the jury," the losing party, who moves for a 
new trial on the ground of misconduct of a member of the jury, 
does not need to show his or her rights were prejudiced but 
only that there is a possibility of undue influence . 
Barnhart v. International Harvester Co., (Okla.), 441 P.2d 
1,000. 
Furthermore, many courts have taken the position that 
since jury misconduct challenges fundamental rights to an 
unprejudiced jury and fairness of the trial proceedings, 
the issue of the prejudicial effect of such misconduct is a 
clear-cut appellate issue if the trial court refuses to 
grant a new trial. Andrews v. County of Orange (4th Dist.) 
130 Cal. App. 3d 944, 182 Cal. Rptr. 176 (disagreed with by 
~
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Aguirre v. Drevry Chemical Co. (4th Dist.) 162 Cal. App. 3d 
187, 208 Cal. Rptr. 390, op withdrawn by order of ct.); 
People v. Brown (5th Dist.) 61 Cal. App. 3d 476, 132 Cal. 
Rptr. 217. 
III. Vitiating The Verdict 
Where misconduct is proved it will presumptively vitiate 
the verdict. Babb v. State, 18 Ariz. 505, 163 P. 259; State 
v. Harris, 69 W.Va. 244, 71 S.E. 609. Misconduct on the part 
of any one of the individuals composing the jury as the result 
of which a fair, due, and impartial consideration of the case 
may have been prevented is to be regarded as misconduct of the 
jury vitiating the verdict. Thomas v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 
185 Kan. 6, 340 P.2s 379; Bolt v. State, 112 Tex. Crim. 267, 
16 S.W. 2d 235; Taylor v. State, 101 Tex. Crim. 201, 274 S.W. 
622; Adams vy State, 92 Tex. Crim. 264, 243 S.W. 474. 
IV. Acts Of One Are Acts Of All 
The jury can act only as a unit, and the misconduct of one 
of the members cannot be segregated. Thomas v. Kansas Power & 
Light, supra; Bolt v. State, supra; Taylor v. State, supra; 
Adams v. State, supra. Improper conduct of one juror is 
chargeable to the whole panel. Corpus Juris cited in Blakeney 
v. Alabama Power Co., 133 So. 16, 20, 222 Ala. 394; Martin v. 
Oregon Stages, 277 P. 291, 129 Or. 435; Hansen v. Miller, 
276 N.W. 150, 65 S.D. 546. 
- 4 -
c r *7 o r: 
V. Prejudice Or Ill-Will Of Juror 
It is within the discretion of the trial court to 
declare a mistrial in a criminal jury trial when it is shown 
that a juror is or becomes so prejudiced during the trial 
that he or she cannot serve as a fair and impartial juror 
and give both the state and defendant a fair trial. State 
of Kansas v. Howard, 557 P.2d 1280, 1285 (1976). 
A defendant is entitled to be tried by a jury of fair 
and impartial persons, and trial court may, in the exercise 
of its discretion, grant a mistrial if it reasonably appears 
that one or several members of a jury have become biased and 
will not engage in honest deliberation. Merritt v. First 
Judicial District Court, 67 Nev. 604. 
Where it was uncontradicted that one juror 
had stated to another person before submission of the case 
in reference to the defendant, "he is guilty," it was clear 
that the juror had prejudiced the case by expressing a clear 
opinion of guilt before he had heard all of the evidence -
serious misconduct which required a new trial. People v. 
Brown (5th Dist.) 61 Cal. App. 3d 476, 132 Cal. Rptr. 217. 
The fact that during the progress of the trial and 
before submission of the case a juror has made statements 
outside the jury room concerning the case or evidence offered 
therein, indicating a fixed opinion unfavorable to the losing 
party or ill-will toward him, is ground for a new trial. 
- 5 -
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Blakeney v. Alamba Power Co,, supra; Martin v. Oregon 
Stages, supra; Hansen v. Miller, supra, Although the case 
for a new trial is stronger if the opinion was expressed 
after a conversation with the other party, a new trial 
should be allowed where the juror was clearly prejudiced. 
Pool v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., C.C. Iowa, 6 F.844, 2 McCrary 
251. 
Statements of jurors during the progress of the trial 
disclosing that they have made up their minds as to the 
verdict without regard to the evidence that has been or will 
be produced in the case, or revealing antagonism toward the 
defendant, is ground for a new trial. Andrews v. County 
of Orange, supra; York v. Wyman, 115 Me. 353, 98 A. 1,024; 
McKahan v. Baltimore & O.R.Co., 223 Pa. 1, 72 A. 251; 
Goodright v. M!Causland (Pa.) 1 Yeates 372; French v. Smith, 
4 Vt. 363; Rowe v. Shenandoah Pulp Co., 42 W.Va. 551, 26 
S.E. 320. 
VI. Juror Disregard Of Court's Instructions 
When the court has instructed the individual jurors not 
once, but many times, to not discuss the case with anyone 
during the trial and to keep an open mind and to not form 
an opinion until all of the evidence is in, and when a juror, 
in disregard of the court's instructions, does the opposite, 
these are grounds for a new trial. 
- 6 -
r p"; o n 
A new trial may be granted for such misconduct where the 
guilty juror has shown his disregard for the court's instruc-
tions, Hansen v. Miller, supra. 
The seriousness of such juror disregard and misconduct 
arises from the fact that any private communication by a 
juror in a criminal case on any subject connected with the 
trial is presumptively prejudicial. Remmer v. United States, 
347 U.S. 227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954); Conforte 
v. State, 77 Nev. 269, 362 P. 2d 274 (1961). 
VII. Juror Misconduct Not Known Until After The Trial 
A new trial may be granted where the juror's misconduct 
was not known to the losing party until after the trial. 
Hansen v. Miller, supra. 
Where the misconduct occurs before submission of the 
case, and the complaining party who is filing the motion 
does not learn about it before the verdict is rendered, the 
failure to make an objection before verdict cannot affect 
the right to apply for a new trial. Tex. & N.O.R. Co. v. 
Underhill C.A.5 Tex.) 234 F.2d 620, 64 A.L.R.2d 152. 
An affidavit obtained after sentence has been passed 
can be used to support an objection later. State v. Robinson, 
20 W. Va. 713 (superceded by statute on other grounds as 
stated in State v. Young (W.Va.) 311 S.E. 2d 118, later 
proceeding (W.Va.) 317 S.E.2d 812). 
vi t bib 
VIII. Burden On State To Rebut 
If the juryfs impartiality has been adversly affected, 
or if the prosecution's burden of proof has been lightened; 
if the answer to either of these questions is in the affirma-
tive, the defendant has been prejudiced and there is no re-
buttal of the presumption of prejudice. People v. Andrews 
(2nd Dist.) 149 Cal. App. 3d 358, 196 Cal. Rptr. 796, 46 
A.L.R. 4th 1. 
Many jurisdictions take the position that jury misconduct 
in a criminal case raises a presumption of prejudice and, 
unless the prosecution rebuts that presumption by proof that 
no prejudice actually resulted, the defendant is entitled to 
a new trial. People v. Pierce, 24 Cal 3d 199, 155 Cal. Rptr. 
657, 595 P.2d 91; People v. Andrews (2nd Dist.) 149 Cal. 
App. 3d 358, 196 Cal. Rptr. 796, 46 AL.R. 4th 1; People 
v. Sutter (5th Dist.) 134 Cal. App. 3d 806, 184 Cal Rptr. 829. 
The burden is on the state to show that these communica-
tions had no prejudicial effect which was adverse to the 
defendant. Remmer v. United States, supra; Parsons v. State, 
74 Nev. 302, 329 P-2d 1070 (1958). 
IX. The Test Of Juror Misconduct Resulting In Prejudice To 
The Defendant 
The test in a criminal case is not whether the jurors 
were actually prejudiced by misconduct of one or more jurors 
but whether any member of the jury might have been so pre-
CC789 
judiced. Thompson v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 704, 70 S.E. 
2d 284. 
It need not be shown that the verdict was actually 
influenced by such misconduct. Cooper v. Carr, 126 N.W. 
468, 161 Mich. 405. 
Where evidence taken on a motion for a new trial leaves 
it reasonable doubtful whether misconduct of the jury 
resulted in injury, the motion should be granted. 
St. Louis S.W.R. Co. v. Robinson (Tex. Com. App.) 285 S.W. 
269, 46 A.L.R. 1,507. 
Dated this 2 h ^ day of July, 1993. 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing 
to Charlene Barlow, Assistant Attorney General Office, 111 
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 
<y(o jj^ day of July, 1993. 
CC7P0 
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JOHN B. TENNEY 
Pro Se 
8415 Kings Hill Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone: (801) 942-8144 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD D. CHRISTENSEN 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
JOHN B. TENNEY : Case No. 921901056FS 
JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
Defendant. 
This Affidavit is given under oath and is based upon 
personal knowledge: 
1. My name is RICHARD D. CHRISTENSEN, D.D.S. and I am a 
dentist who operates a partnership with Dr. Richard L. Barnett. 
2. That on or about May 25, 1993, I was in the office I 
share with Dr. Barnett. 
3. That on or about May 25, 1993, Dr. Barnett came into 
the office at approximately 5:00 p.m. and informed me that due to 
jury duty he was holding office hours between 5:00 p.m. and 11:00 
p.m. 
4. That during the above-reference^conversation Dr. 
Barnett indicated to me that it was his understanding that a friend 
WAS ^c 
of mine was involved in the case for which heAserving as a juror. 
5. In this conversation it was indicated that John B. 
Tenney was the Defendant in a criminal case involving securities 
fraud upon which Dr. Barnett sat as a juror. 
C G 7 9 1 
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6. In this conversation I indicated to Dr. Barnett that I 
in fact did know John B. Tenney• 
7. That during this conversation Dr. Barnett made the 
statement "that he is really a bad guy." 
8. That from the context of the conversation it was clear 
that Dr. Barnett was referring to John B. Tenney. 
9. That following Dr. Barnett/s characterization of John 
B. Tenney as "a bad guy" I indicated to Dr. Barnett that my 
experiences with John Tenney had been all good. 
10. In response to my statement Dr. Barnett stated that, "I 
know, I shouldn't talk about it at all." 
11. The above conversation which took place on or about May 
25, 1993, ended at that point. 
DATED this ^6 day of July, 1993. 
RICHARD D. CHRISTENSEN, D.D.S. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
County of Salt Lake 
n r ~ C\ o 
JOHN B. TENNEY 
Pro Se 
8415 Kings Hill Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone: (801) 942-8144 
JUL 2 6 1993 
SALT LAKE COJKTY 
DJ ^ §\t™*V^/ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARGARET WALLACE 
V. 
JOHN B. TENNEY Case No. 921901056FS 
JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
Defendant, 
This Affidavit is given under oath and is based upon 
personal knowledge: 
1. My name is MARGARET WALLACE, and I work in the office 
of Dr. Richard D. Christensen and Dr. Richard L. Barnett. 
2. That on or about May 25, 1993, I was in their office. 
3. That on or about May 25, 1993, Dr. Barnett came into 
the office at approximately 5:00 p.m. and stated that due to jury 
duty he was holding office hours between 5:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. 
4. That during the above-reference^conversation Dr. 
Barnett indicated that it was his understanding that a friend of Dr. 
Christensen was involved in the case for which he serving as a juror. 
5. In this conversation it was indicated that John B. 
Tenney was the Defendant in a criminal case involving securities 
fraud upon which Dr. Barnett sat as a juror. 
f- r. ~ T * 
6. That during this conversation Dr. Barnett made the 
statement "that he is really a bad guy." 
7. That from the context of the conversation it was clear 
that Dr. Barnett was referring to John B. Tenney. 
DATED thisryfo day of July, 1993. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
County of Salt Lake 
On the /^/^^5ay of July, 1993, personally appeared before 
me, MARGARET WALLACE, the signer of the foregoing iijstrument, who 
duly acknowledged to me that he executed/the sai 
- - - . • : v P . - . ^ , 
My Commission Expires » //y/y 
(/Mir/fa/os rfTL 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to Charlene 
Barlow, Assistant Attorney General Office, 111 State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 2*6'flC day of July, 1993, 
£L /%. xj^~^r 
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JAN GRAHAM #1231 
Utah Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW #0212 
Assistant Attorney General 
LYNN NICHOLAS #6008 
Assistant Attorney General 
111 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
(801) 538-1331 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
Plaintiff, : RICHARD L. BARNETT 
vs. : Case No. 921901056 
JOHN B. TENNEY, : Judge Tyrone Medley 
Defendant. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
I, RICHARD L. BARNETT, DDS, after being duly sworn, hereby 
depose and state that: 
1. I am currently licensed to practice dentistry within the 
State of Utah and am self-employed as an orthodontist residing in 
Salt Lake County, Utah. 
2. My current dental practice is located at 9229 South 
Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, Utah where I office-share with Dr. 
Richard Christensen. My wife, Tammy Barnett, is employed by 
me as a receptionist/office manager. 
3. On May 18, 1993 I was called to report for jury duty to 
the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah. I was 
subsequently selected as a juror for the subject trial. 
4. On or about May 25, 1993, I made a brief visit to my 
office after leaving Court. My wife was working that morning and, 
upon my walking into the office, my wife made the statement to me 
that: "You're not going to believe this, but Dick knows John 
Tenney." I expressed some surprise and went about my business. 
5. After finishing with a patient, Dr. Christensen came into 
the room where I was at and told me that he knew John Tenney. I 
advised him that I could not talk about the case until after the 
trial. 
6. After a short discussion about Dr. Christensen knowing 
Mr. Tenney, I made a statement to the effect that Mr. Tenney 
appeared to be a "slick operator" but I didn't know at this time if 
he had broken any laws. I also stated that I would have to wait 
until after hearing all of the evidence before I decided. 
7. I did not feel that I discussed anything with Dr. 
Christensen which would have any influence upon my decision in this 
case. 
8. I had not made any personal decision at that point in 
time as to Mr. Tenney's guilt or innocence. 
DATED this if*? day of 1993. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 
1993. 
day of August, 
MYOpmmLssion Expiresv-
Residing Wn 
• liJJexi/ 
SCHERE£fc.WiLCC*< A 
257 East 200 South #C£0] 
Saft Lake Cisy. Utah 841 i1 J 
My Commission Espies -» 
State cf Utah J 
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ADDENDUM E 
Restitution Order 
Portion of 
Transcript of Restitution Hearing 
Third Judicial L;:stnct 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW (0212) 
LYNN NICHOLAS (6008) 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1331 
OCT 1 9 1994 
Dy^L. 
!\_LO-».'i Y 
fce^uiy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
a\H3\o51 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOHN B. TENNEY, 
Defendant. 
\G^-M4-%-.05c^ 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 921901056 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
This matter came on for hearing on September 6, 1994, 
at 9:00 a.m., for a determination of the amount of restitution 
owed by defendant. Restitution had been ordered at sentencing 
after defendant was convicted by jury of twenty-seven counts of 
violations of securities law. Defendant was present and 
represented by counsel, Richard Uday, Salt Lake Legal Defenders 
Association; the State was represented by Charlene Barlow and 
Lynn Nicholas, Assistant Attorneys General. 
THE COURT, having been fully advised in the premises, 
now enters its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. 
n^sni 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant has insisted throughout the proceedings 
that he intends to pay back the victims who purchased stock in 
his company. 
2. Defendant is employable and capable of paying the 
victims. 
3. There is no dispute between the parties regarding 
the following victims and restitution amounts: 
a. Gerald R. Berg $20,000 
b. Jeffrey Stout 3,000 
c. John E. Cawley 8,000 
d. Ronald A. Frost 10,000 
e. David Ingraham 2,500 
f. Phillip Holmes 500 
g. Shirley (Dale) Panting 5,950 
h. Jeffrey Ulibarri 1,000 
i. Richard Ulibarri 3,000 
4. The restitution owing another victim, James 
Zieglowsky, was disputed by the parties and was the subject of 
the restitution hearing. 
5. The proffered facts relating to defendant's sale of 
stock to Mr. Zieglowsky are set forth in the State's memorandum 
in support of restitution filed on September 6, 1994. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has read the cases cited by defendant in 
his memorandum regarding restitution and concludes that those 
cases are distinguishable from the present case. The restitution 
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asked for regarding Mr. Zieglowsky is more directly related to 
the criminal conviction than is apparent in the cases cited by 
defendant. 
2. The calculations regarding Mr, Zieglowsky's losses 
attributable to defendant which are contained in the State's 
memorandum are fair, reasonable, equitable and even conservative 
given the Court's ability to order up to double the amount of 
pecuniary loss as restitution. 
3. The amount of $39,000 is the proper amount of 
restitution for Mr. Zieglowsky based on the analysis provided in 
the State's memorandum. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 
1. Defendant is to pay restitution to the following 
victims in the following amounts: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
g-
h. 
Gerald R. Berg 
Jeffrey Stout 
John E. Cawley 
Ronald A. Frost 
David Ingraham 
Phillip Holmes 
Shirley (Dale) Panting 
Jeffrey Ulibarri 
$20,000 
3,000 
8,000 
10,000 
2,500 
500 
5,950 
1,000 
-3-
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i. Richard Ulibarri 
j. James Zieglowsky 
3,000 
39,000 
DATED this If day of October, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
MEDLEY 
ct Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, this 11 day of October, 
1994, to: 
Richard Uday, Esq. 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDERS ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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key to the apartment. And, in fact, when Mr. Zieglowsky 
walked away from the apartment, as counsel indicated, he 
was not given notice that he was to then assume those 
responsibilities, nor did he receive the wherewithal to 
assume those responsibilities. 
He would further indicate for purposes of a 
payment schedule for restitution that he is presently 
employed at Advantage Mortgage making a gross amount of 
$1500 a month. That turns out to be a net of $1350 a 
month. The probation department and he have figured out 
a $200 a month restitution payment is owed, leaving for 
Mr. Tenney and the family of five, $1150 a month income. 
The only assets that he has are an '86 Cadillac 
that they are sharing between the four licensed drivers. 
MR. TENNEY: That is correct. 
MR. UDAY: And the second car, that is not 
working. Presently needs about $650 worth of 
transmission work. That would be Mr. Tenney"s testimony 
if he were to testify today. 
If the Court would like, I could indicate our 
dispute with the 19,000 to Mr. Zieglowsky. 
THE COURT: Go ahead, sir. 
MR. UDAY: Thank you. Your Honor. Basically, 
the other $19,000 that has been talked about by counsel 
today, we would argue is not appropriate restitution. In 
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essence, our position would be, Judge, that that amount 
of money would fall into the province of civil 
litigation, if anything at all, and that Mr. Zieglowsky 
should not have the benefit of the Attorney General's 
Office to pursue this claim on his behalf. 
The support we would have for that argument. 
Your Honor, flows from a fairly recent case called "State 
vs. Burton," from the Utah Appellate Court, if I may 
approach. I have handed counsel this case as well. 
In this case briefly, Judge, what occurred was 
a real estate transaction, not unlike the one that 
occurred here. In essence, an individual who could not 
obtain a loan to purchase a property bought the property 
on a Contract of Sale. Where he agreed to pay "A," MAM 
agreed to pay "B," and "B" would in theory pay the 
mortgage company. What happened is "A" paid "B." 
Everything was fine for a while. MB" then did not at one 
point continue in his payment to the mortgage company. 
The mortgage company foreclosed on who was "A" living in 
the home or having possession of the home. "A" then 
sought the services of the County Attorney's Office who 
prosecuted a theft case against "B," and the Court at 
page 819 of that opinion indicated that they are slow to 
give approval to the broad construction of theft that was 
urged by the state in that particular case. Basically 
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holding that that, in fact, is a civil matter; that the 
contractor that was involved in that situation between 
those parties had obligations that were civil in nature. 
If someone defaulted in that obligation, that the claim 
should have been pursued civilly as a civil remedy, 
rather than a criminal. Clarifying the subsequent case, 
that it is not a question of whether there is another 
remedy, civil versus criminal, you can't have both in a 
particular case. But that this type of contract dispute 
over real estate property is a civil matter and did not 
include criminal considerations. 
I think closely related to this Burton case is 
the case I recall from, I believe it is the Court of 
Appeals as well. State vs. Robinson, which was an 
individual in Circuit Court, pled guilty to a traffic 
offense, maybe two traffic offenses and relating to an 
automobile accident. One was maybe a speeding or failure 
to make the lane change properly, or something, and no 
driver's license. As part of the guilty plea in that 
case, the Judge ordered 13,000-some-odd dollars 
restitution for the injuries that were suffered by the 
car who was hit by virtue of the traffic violation. The 
Court, after answering some other issues that were 
Presented before it, indicated that due process did not 
allow the Court to order restitution in that collateral 
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kind of a question primarily because it did not give the 
offender in that situation a forum in which he could 
dispute perhaps the causation factor or a combination of 
co-negligence. Comparative negligence is what we call 
it. I'm not working in that area of the law, and because 
of that due process, prohibited the Court from ordering 
that amount of restitution. 
I would say that the combination of those two 
cases in this incident ought to clarifv for us that Mr. 
Tenney is not responsible for the $19,000. He did not 
have any title or any physical possession of that 
property in any way. He never collected rents, but 
perhaps when Mr. Zieglowsky walked away, that that is 
really what happened. He walked awav and rents were not 
collected by anyone as the state suggested. If that is 
the case, there may be a comparative negligence kind of a 
claim that Mr. Tenney could raise at some point, which 
would then violate due process in this Court for the 
Court to impose that additional amount of restitution 
here. 
Additionally, because there is a contract that 
was signed by these parties and because these are 
collateral issues to the sale of securities which he was 
found guilty for by the jury, I believe that these are 
collateral questions and the Court should not impose that 
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additional $19,000 worth of restitution, and order 20,000 
to Mr. Zieglowsky. Thank you. Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I have a guestion for you, Mr. 
Uday. First of all, do you have a cite for the Robinson 
case? 
MR. UDAY: I do. It is 860 P2d 979. If I may 
approach. Co-counsel is provided that a copy of that as 
well. Your Honor. 
THE COURT: The other issue I want to raise 
with you, Mr. Uday, and I will give Ms. Barlow a chance 
to respond to that, the jury in this case found Mr. 
Tenney guilty of what amounts to a fraud case for the 
most part. I mean, I recognize the other differences, 
but my concern is this, and I recognize this matter is on 
appeal. 
The restitution statute allows the Court under 
appropriate circumstances to award restitution up to, I 
think, double the amount. That is probably not a 
verbatim quote, but I am wondering if you are aware of 
any cases in the State of Utah that may have cited the 
provision in the restitution statute allowing a trial 
court to award up to double the amount of restitution? 
And if you are aware of such a statute, do you know what 
criteria ought to be met before a Court imposes up to 
double the amount? 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOHN B. TENNEY, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL 
Case No. 921901056FS 
JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
The prosecutor stated in her opening statement that, this 
case is about people being taken by a smooth talking salesman who 
"defrauded" three hundred and thirty-three people out of their 
money. This statement as well as the theme of the prosecutor's 
opening statement is not supported by any evidence in the record. 
Since the prosecution has rested and since the burden is on the 
state to come forth with all evidence necessary to support their 
allegations, Mr. Tenney herein moves for a mistrial based on the 
prejudicial and unsupported statements made during the prosecutor's 
opening statement. 
Court's follow the general rule that, "the assertion of 
facts in an opening statement which are not proved during trial may 
constitute grounds for a mistrial if there is a reasonable 
possibility that the admissible evidence contributed to the 
conviction." State v. West, 617 P.2d 1298, 1300 (Mont. 1980). See 
00579 
also State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984) (counsel is obligated 
to avoid reference to those matters the jury is not justified in 
considering, and where there was no compelling proof of defendant's 
guilt, court concluded reversal was required because jurors probably 
were influenced by the improper remarks). 
The Court has already ruled that the prejudicial affect of 
the shareholder list outweighed the probative value of its 
admission. In suppressing the introduction of the shareholder list, 
the Court expressed its concern over the impact such a list would 
have upon the jury. This concern is magnified when applied to the 
opening statement declaration that Mr. Tenney had "defrauded" three 
hundred and thirty-three people. This evidence has not been 
solicited through the state's factual witnesses and the mere numbers 
is highly inflammatory and prejudicial to Mr. Tenney. 
Approximately, the first sentence out of the prosecutor's 
mouth referred to Mr. Tenney "defrauding" three hundred and 
thirty-three people. The primacy of this statement and the 
inability of the state to bring forward any evidence of any 
shareholder being defrauded, beyond the thirteen listed in the 
information, establishes a reasonable possibility that the 
inadmissible evidence would contribute to a conviction. State v. 
West, 617 P.d at 1300. Therefore, this court should grant Mr. 
Tenney's motion for a mistrial. 
DATED this J J JC day of May, 1993. 
B. TENNEY t 
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1 Utah, defendant John B. Tenney engaged in violations of 
2 Section 61-1-3, subsection 2 of the Utah Securities Act, 
3 by willfully employing the following persons, among 
4 others, as unregistered agents in the offer or sale of 
5 securities to the investors listed above. And those two 
6 alleged employees, in count 28, is alleged to be Steven 
7 Rick Jensen and in count 29, it is alleged to be Steven 
8 Bowers. To all of those charges, members of the jury, 
9 Mr. Tenney has entered a plea of not guilty. 
10 Ms. Nicholas, you may go forward with your 
11 opening statement. 
12 MS. NICHOLAS: Ladies and gentlemen, good 
13 afternoon. This is a case about innocent, hard-working 
14 people who got taken in a securities scam. They got 
15 taken by a smooth-talking salesman who sold them stock 
16 that wasn't worth the paper it was written on. The 
17 defendant, John Tenney, deliberately defrauded dozens of 
18 decent people, 333 people, mostly citizens of Utah, 
19 bought Cellwest stock for somewhere between 4 million and 
20 $11 million. So the State has charged him with 29 counts 
21 of violating the Utah Blue Sky Law. That is the Utah 
22 Uniform Securities Act, and we will talk about the Blue 
23 Sky Law a little bit later. While Tenney was collecting 
24 all of that money, investors were losing their shirts. 
25 Let me tell you about one of those investors: 
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1 Jim Zieglowsky, an ordinary Federal Express delivery man. 
2 On a cold December morning in 1987, Jim got up, put on 
3 his Federal Express uniform, and went off to a training 
4 conference. During the break, he chatted with one of his 
5 co-workers, Rick Jensen. Rich told him about a hot stock 
6 deal. Rick said that he had invested in Cellwest and he 
7 was certain that stock was going to go sky high and he 
8 was selling it himself, and he would introduce Jim to 
9 John Tenney so that Jim could do the same thing. Jim was 
10 so excited. Jim has children. He wants to send those 
11 children to college and he thought this was an 
12 opportunity to accumulate some money to send those kids 
13 to college. So he met Tenney that very night at Marie 
14 Callender's out on 7200 South. Tenney arrived with a 
15 cellular telephone in his hand and he told Jim about 
16 Cellwest. He said Cellwest is in the business of leasing 
17 cellular telephones to car rentals. A great idea, an 
18 idea whose time had come. The company was going to go 
19 public in 90 days. This was a ground floor opportunity. 
20 It was bound to be big, and the stock was going to be 
21 listed on three stock exchanges. And Tenney expected it 
22 to go to $50 a share by June. But Just in case something 
23 went wrong, Tenney said, "I will enter into an agreement 
24 with you. I will buy the stock back in six months at $5 
25 a share.M That was more than double what Jim was going 
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1 to have to pay for it at $2 a share. 
2 Jim went home and talked to his wife Denna. He 
3 thought this was a good idea. And they decided maybe 
4 this guaranteed Cellwest stock which seemed to be 
5 virtually risk-free, was a better way to save to send 
6 their kids to college. So Jim went back to Tenney and he 
7 said, "I don't have cash but I have got some property." 
8 And Tenney said, "That is as good as cash. I can turn it 
9 into cash." So Jim entered into an exchange agreement 
10 with Tenney. He exchanged his real estate for Cellwest 
11 stock. He believed in Cellwest. He believed in Cellwest 
12 so much that he bought stock for his children. He bought 
13 stock for Joshua. He bought stock for Angela. He bought 
14 stock for Crystal. He bought stock for Rachel. 
15 Time passed and Cellwest did not go public. 
16 Cellwest wasn't listed on one exchange, much less three. 
17 So Jim came to Tenney and said, "I want to exercise my 
18 option under the agreement. I want you to buy my stock 
19 back at $5 a share." And Tenney said he couldn't. He 
20 wouldn't. So Jim lost nearly everything he had. He lost 
21 one piece of rental property out there. He had to pay 
22 thousands in arrears on another piece because Tenney had 
23 bothered to make the mortgage payments and it went into 
24 foreclosure. And Jim's children didn't have a college 
25 fund. 
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1 (Jury leaves .) 
2 THE COURT: The record may reflect that 
3 the Jury has been excused from the the courtroom. The 
4 parties are present, however. 
5 Mr. Tenney, you have a motion which 
6 you'd like to make? 
7 MR. TENNEY: Yes, I do, your Honor. The 
8 motion Ifd like to make, I've just handed to you in 
9 written form. I'd like to just orally make this 
10 motion and argue it very briefly. 
11 This is a motion for a mistrial. And 
12 the basis for this motion is that the Prosecutor, Lynn 
13 Nicholas, stated in her opening statement that this 
14 case is a case about people being taken by a 
15 smooth-talking salesman who, quote, defrauded 333 
16 people out of their money. 
17 This statement, as well as the theme of 
18 the Prosecutor's opening statement, is not supported 
19 by evidence in the record. And since the Prosecution 
20 has rested and since the burden is on the State to 
21 come forward with all the evidence that's necessary to 
22 support their allegations, I move for a mistrial based 
23 on the very serious prejudicial and unsupported 
24 statement made during the opening statement by the 
25 State. 
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1 The Court, of course, follows the 
2 general rule that, quote, the assertion of facts in an 
3 opening statement which are not proved during trial 
4 may constitute grounds for a mistrial if there is a 
5 reasonable possibility that the admissible evidence 
6 contributed to the conviction, end of quote* That's 
7 quoting from State v. West 617 -- quoted in 617 P.2d 
8 at 1298. It's a Montana 1980 case. 
9 THE COURT: Do you have a copy of that 
10 case? 
11 MR. TENNEY: I don't have it. I am 
12 sorry, yes, I do. 
13 THE COURT: Go ahead. Are you through, 
14 Mr. Tenney? 
15 MR. TENNEY: Not quite. The — counsel 
16 is obligated to avoid any reference to any matters 
17 that the jury is not justified in considering. And as 
18 I've argued forcefully earlier today, this is, I 
19 think, a very serious prejudicial error. And where 
20 there is no compelling proof of my guilt, the court in 
21 this case concluded that reversal was required because 
22 the jurors probably were influenced by the improper 
23 remarks. 
24 I think it is unquestionable that the 
25 Jurors believe that there are 333 stockholders in the 
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1 company based upon the statements made by the 
2 statements made by the State in the opening 
3 statement* 
4 The Court has already ruled that the 
5 prejudicial effect of this Stockholder List or 
6 Shareholder List has outweighed probative value. So, 
7 in suppressing the introduction of the Shareholders 
8 List# the Court also expressed its concern over the 
9 impact that this list would have on the Jury. And 
10 it's magnified when we apply it to the opening 
11 statement that Mr. Tenney, quote/ defrauded 333 
12 people. The evidence has not been solicited through 
13 the State's factual witnesses, and the mere numbers 
14 are highly inflammatory and prejudicial to me, 
15 Mr. Tenney. 
16 Nearly the very first heard sentence ou 
17 of the Prosecutor's mouth referred to me as, quote, 
18 defrauding 333 people. This statement and the fact o 
19 the inability of the State to bring forward any 
20 evidence of any such claim of any shareholder being 
21 defrauded, other than those they've brought into the 
22 court here as witnesses, establishes, clearly, a 
23 reasonable possibility that the inadmissible evidence 
24 would, in fact, contribute to a conviction. 
25 As I stated earlier, I'm greatly 
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1 concerned about the effect it would have on the minds 
2 and hearts of the Jurors. And, again, we are quoting 
3 here from State v. West, at 617 P•2d at 1300. 
4 For this reason, the Court should grant 
5 my motion for a mistrial at this time. Thank you. 
6 THE COURT; Thank you, Mr. Tenney. 
7 Miss Barlow? 
8 MS. BARLOW: Your Honor, I would like to 
9 first correct -- the statement that Ms. Nicholas made 
10 was that John Tenney deliberately defrauded dozens of 
11 innocent -- excuse me, decent people, 333 people, 
12 mostly citizens of Utah, were taken by that man for a 
13 lot of money. So maybe to get correctly what was 
14 said. She never did say he defrauded 333 people. 
15 But that's -- the significant point is 
16 that -- and I believe it's State v. Troy. I can't 
17 remember if that's the actual case name. But there is 
18 a case — I believe it's State v. Troy -- that says 
19 there are certain matters -- well, when the Court is 
20 looking at prosecutorial misconduct, which is what the 
21 claim is here, the Court has a two-prong test: One, 
22 did the person -- did the prosecutor say something 
23 that the jury was not supposed to be privy to, and 
24 then, number two, did it prejudice the case? 
25 Granted, we mentioned 333 people because 
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ADDENDUM G 
Improper Expert Testimony 
1 A Well, there is a tendency for people to just 
2 read as little as possible and so it is placed at the 
3 beginning of the document to increase the likelihood that 
4 they will at least have read the risks that are 
5 associated with the securities being offered. 
6 Q Are you familiar with the concept of 
7 materiality? 
8 A I am. 
9 Q In the securities law? 
10 A Uh-huh. 
11 Q What does that term mean under Utah law? 
12 A Well, materiality goes to the need for 
13 disclosure. and it basically, in the State of Utah, as 
14 with most jurisdictions, most states, is a statement that 
15 all information that is of value to a reasonable investor 
16 needs to be disclosed, so that investor can make an 
17 informed investment decision. 
18 Q So, would you say that material information is 
19 the information that a reasonable investor would want to 
20 know in making an investment decision? 
21 A That is correct. 
22 Q And if someone selling securities misrepresents 
23 such information, is that a material misrepresentation? 
24 A That is. 
25 Q And if someone selling securities fails to 
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1 disclose such material information, is that a material 
2 omission? 
3 A It is. There has been a lack of disclosure. 
4 Q Are statements to the effect that a company is 
5 going to go public imminently material? 
6 A Definitely material to the investor. 
7 Q Are statements that a company's stock will be 
8 listed on an exchange, material? 
9 A Very much so. That gives the indication to the 
10 investor, the potential or probability of later selling 
11 the stock to someone else. 
12 Q Are predictions regarding stock prices 
13 material? 
14 A Definitely. 
15 Q Are the risks inherent in a securities offering 
16 material information? 
17 A It is. 
18 Q Would a reasonable investor want to know the 
19 operating history of a company or the lack thereof? 
20 A Most definitely. 
21 Q Would a reasonable investor want to have an 
22 opportunity to review the company's financial statements? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q Is the nature of a company's competition in the 
25 industry material information? 
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1 A That is very material. If the company is 
2 competing in a very competitive industry, then that 
3 becomes a risk to the investor particularly if the 
4 company offering the securities does not have the ability 
5 to compete with those other companies. 
6 Q Are restrictions that might be placed on the 
7 resale of a stock, is that material information? 
8 A Very much so. 
9 Q Is the nature of the market for a company stock 
10 material information? 
11 A When you say "nature," I am assuming does a 
12 market exist or does not exist? 
13 Q Correct. 
14 A That is true. That is material disclosure. 
15 Q And the proceeds of the offering, the use of 
16 the proceeds of the offering, the use of the proceeds; is 
17 that material information? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q The compensation of the company's officers, is 
20 that material information? 
21 A Most definitely. The investor wants to know 
22 whether the money that he is investing is going to the 
23 development and expansion of the company, or going into 
24 the pockets of the officers of the company. 
25 I Q Would a recent bankruptcy of a chief executive 
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1 officer be material information? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q If an officer had violated, had previously been 
4 found to have violated federal securities laws, would 
5 that be material information? 
6 A That is very material, as with the bankruptcy 
7 information because that goes to the ability of the 
8 officer to manage the company, goes to his credibility, 
9 his reliability as a manager. And when investors invest 
10 in companies, they are not just buying into the assets, 
11 but rather into the management of the company as well. 
12 Q Mr. Nielsen, you have just listed several 
13 categories of information that you view as material under 
14 Utah Securities Law. Would the failure to disclose such 
15 information be a material omission under Utah law? 
16 A In my opinion, it would be. 
17 MS. NICHOLAS: May I approach the witness, Your 
18 Honor. 
19 THE COURT: You may. 
20 Q (By Ms. Nicholas) Mr. Nielsen, I am handing you 
21 State's Exhibit 36 which has been previously admitted 
22 into evidence I would like to give you an opportunity to 
23 look at that exhibit. Did you have an opportunity to 
24 review an exhibit that appears very similar to that prior 
25 to coming here to testify today? 
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1 This testimony is not being offered for the truth of 
2 the -- of any matters contained within those 
3 documents/ only as to what she reviewed in order to 
4 come to the conclusions which she's about to testify. 
5 So the objection is noted, but overruled, Mr. Tenney. 
6 THE WITNESS: Should I continue, then? 
7 MS. NICHOLAS: Yes, continue. 
8 A. The Buy-sell Agreement between John B. 
9 Tenney and Jeff Stout, which was dated 12-31-87; the 
10 Articles of Cellwest, Inc., which is know is an 
11 exhibit; the Articles of ReCom, Inc.; some 
12 correspondence from Meredith and Bradford; an 
13 Affidavit of Probable Cause in the Circuit Court and 
14 the Information against Mr. Tenney in the Circuit 
15 Court. Those are the documents which I have 
16 reviewed. 
17 Q. You indicated that you have reviewed one 
18 of the Buy-sell Agreements, specifically the Buy-sell 
19 Agreement between Mr. Tenney and Mr. Jeff Stout? 
20 A. Yes, I have. 
21 Q. In your opinion is that Buy-sell 
22 Agreement a security? 
23 A. Yes, it is. Under both federal law and 
24 the three versions of the Utah Statute which I 
25 reviewed, the agreement -- the Buy-sell Agreement says 
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1 Q. What does "material" mean under state 
2 and federal securities laws? 
3 A. In a sentence, it means a substantial 
4 likelihood that a reasonable investor would find it 
5 important. 
6 Q. The information. 
7 A. The information important, right. 
8 Q. So all information that a reasonable 
9 investor would want to know in making an investment 
10 decision is material information? 
11 A. That's correct. That's correct. 
12 Q. If someone is selling securities and 
13 misrepresents such information, is that a material 
14 misrepresentation? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. If someone is selling securities and 
17 fails to disclose such information, is that a material 
18 omission? 
19 A. Yes, it is. 
20 Q. Are statements to the effect that a 
21 company is going to go public imminently material? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Are statements that a company's stock 
24 would be listed on a stock exchange material? 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 Q. Are predictions regarding stock prices 
2 material? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Are the risks of an investment material? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Would a reasonable investor want to know 
7 the operating history of a company or the lack 
8 thereof? 
9 A. Very much, yes. 
10 Q. Would a reasonable investor want to have 
11 an opportunity to review companies1 financial 
12 statements? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Would a reasonable investor want to know 
15 the nature of a company's competition? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q* Would a reasonable investor want to know 
18 how the proceeds of an offering are to be used? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. The compensation of a company's 
21 officers? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. That a company's chief executive officer 
24 recently declared personal bankruptcy? 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 Q. That the company's chief executive 
2 officer had recently been adjudged to have violated 
3 federal securities law? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q- Would the failure to make disclosure of 
6 that information that you've just cited as material, 
7 would that be a material omission under both state and 
8 federal law? 
9 A. Yes. Failure to make any one of those 
10 disclosures to any one investor would be a material 
11 omission or a material misstatement under both federal 
12 and state securities laws. 
13 Q. Under the Utah Uniform Securities Act? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Could you just briefly explain for the 
16 jury, in general terms, the purpose of securities 
17 registration under both state and federal law? 
18 A. Yes. To reiterate what I said before, a 
19 company is asking people for their money, and the 
20 company is promising in return some piece of paper. 
21 And so the law wants to make sure that because people 
22 can't touch, feel, try on, the piece of paper, that 
23 that the company explain what its all about to 
24 investors. And the law makes it -- it is tough. The 
25 law is tough on disclosure because these people are 
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ADDENDUM H 
Defendant's Requested Instruction 
for Employing an Unregistered Agent 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In the Jury Instruction concerning the "EMPLOYING AN 
UNREGISTERED AGENT", as alleged in Count Twenty-Eight (28) of 
the Amended Information the following change should be made in 
the wording of the instruction: 
3. Employed Steven Rick Jensen as his Agent 
W 
00374 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In the Statefs proposed Jury Instruction concerning the 
"EMPLOYING AN UNREGISTERED AGENT", as alleged in Count Twenty 
Nine of the Amendedlnformation the following change should be 
made in the wording of the instruction: 
3. Employed Steven Bowers as his Agent 
V r 
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ADDENDUM I 
I n s t r u c t i o n No . 1 4 , 2 7 , 4 0 , 4 1 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In order for you to find the Defendant, John B. Tenney, guilty 
of the crime "OFFERING OR SELLING UNREGISTERED SECURITIES", as 
alleged in Count One (1) of the Amended Information, you must find 
from the evidence all of the following elements of the crime: 
1. At sometime subsequent to April 17, 1987, in the State of 
Utah, John B. Tenney; 
2. Willfully; 
3. Offered or sold any security; 
4. To Gerald Berg; 
5. When the securities were not registered with the Utah 
Division of Securities; 
6. And, if the Defendant has asserted that the securities 
were exempt from registration, that an exemption from 
registration was unavailable. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find the Defendant guilty as to Count One (1) of the 
Information. If you believe that the evidence has failed to 
establish one or more of the above elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not guilty of 
the crime charged in Count One (1). 
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INSTRUCTION NO. tf 
Before you can find the Defendant, John B. Tenney, guilty of 
the crime of "SECURITIES FRAUD" as alleged in Count Fourteen (14) 
of the Amended Information, you must find from the evidence all of 
the following elements of the crime: 
1. At sometime subsequent to April 17, 1987, in the State of 
Utah, John B. Tenney, directly or indirectly; 
2. In connection with the offer or sale of any security; 
3. To Gerald Berg; 
4. Willfully; 
5. Either 
a), employed a device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, OR I 
b). made an untrue statement of a material fact or 
omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading, OR 
c). engaged in an act, practice, or course of business 
which operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements of the crime of securities fraud, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty find the Defendant guilty 
as to Count Fourteen (14) of the Information. On the other hand, 
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if the evidence has failed to establish one or more of the above 
elements of the offense charged, it shall be your duty to find the 
Defendant not guilty of the crime charged in Count Fourteen (14). 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 ^ 
In order for you to find the Defendant
 f John B, Tenney, guilty 
of the crime "UNREGISTERED SECURITIES BROKER OR SALES AGENT", as 
alleged in Count Twenty-seven (27) of the Amended Information, you 
must find from the evidence all of the following elements of the 
crime: 
1. Sometime subsequent to April 27, 1987, John B. Tenney; 
2. Transacted business in the State of Utah as a broker-
dealer or agent by; 
3- Willfully; 
4. Offering or selling any security; 
5. To any one or more of the following individuals: Gerald 
Berg, Jeffrey Stout, David Baker, John Cawley, Ronald 
Frost, David Ingraham, Kristy and Phillip Holmes, Dale 
and Shirley Panting, Jeffrey Ulibarri, Richard Ulibarri, 
Rocky Ulibarri, James Zieglowsky, or Marlene Peterson; 
6. When John B. Tenney was not registered as a broker-dealer 
or agent with the Utah Division of Securities; 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find the Defendant guilty as to Count Twenty-seven 
(27) of the Information* If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one or more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
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guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-seven (27). 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
In order for you to find the defendant, John B. Tenney, guilty 
of the crime of "EMPLOYING AN UNREGISTERED AGENT", as alleged in 
Count Twenty-eight (28) of the Amended Information, you must find 
from the evidence all of the following elements of the crime: 
1. Sometime subsequent to April 17, 1987, in the State of 
Utah, John B. Tenney, a broker-dealer or issuer: 
2. Willfully; 
3. Employed Steven Rick Jensen; 
4. To offer or sell any security; 
5. To Jeffrey Stout, Jeffrey, Richard and Rocky Ulibarri, or 
Kristy and Phillip Holmes; 
6. When Steven Rick Jensen was not licensed as an agent with 
the Utah Division of Securities, 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find the defendant guilty as to Count Twenty-eight 
(28) of the Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one or more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-eight (28) . 
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ADDENDUM J 
C o l l o q u y 
1 there are a number of questions, Mr. Tenney, I would like 
2 to put to you. Maybe these questions have been put to you 
3 by a prior judge, but since I am going to be the judge 
4 that is ultimately responsible for this case, I need to 
5 satisfy myself regarding your choice to represent yourself 
6 in this matter. 
7 And I will simply start, Mr. Tenney, by asking 
8 you is it still your desire to continue to represent 
9 yourself in this matter, sir? 
10 MR. TENNEY: Yes, it is, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: Now, Mr. Tenney, I am curious 
12 as to what your educational level is. 
13 MR. TENNEY: I have a master's degree in 
14 business administration. 
15 THE COURT: And what year did you obtain that 
16 degree? 
17 MR. TENNEY: 1968. About 30 years in the 
18 business world. 
19 THE COURT: And have you on any prior occasions, 
20 Mr. Tenney, represented yourself in any other criminal 
21 matters? And I ask you that question not to try to 
22 discover any prior record, but to try to determine what 
23 kind of experience you have in the criminal justice 
24 system. 
25 MR. TENNEY: I have not represented myself in 
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1 any criminal case. This is the first criminal charge I 
2 have ever had, but I did represent myself in the civil 
3 case involving the Federal Securities & Exchange 
4 Commission. The attorneys were brought in from the 
5 Washington office, D.C. I represented myself there. 
6 I have also represented myself currently appearing 
7 pro se, and I just argued an oral argument before 
8 the Court of Appeals in the State of Idaho, which 
9 will be ruled on shortly. 
10 THE COURT: That is civil or criminal. 
11 MR. TENNEY: These are both civil matters. 
12 THE COURT: Mr. Tenney, do you understand the 
13 difference between the civil process and the criminal 
14 process, sir? 
15 MR. TENNEY: I believe I do. I am certainly not 
16 an expert in the law, but I believe I understand the basic 
17 difference, I guess. 
18 THE COURT: One of the concerns the Court has, 
19 Mr. Tenney, is that it sounds as if based upon your 
20 education and experience, it would appear to me you 
21 certainly have the ability and capability, in all 
22 likelihood, to master the facts. But one of the concerns 
23 that I have, Mr. Tenney, is even though you may have the 
24 ability to understand and master the facts, presenting 
25 those facts consistent with the rules of procedure and 
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1 rules of evidence is something very different and 
2 something which usually requires not only that one have 
3 the training of legal education, but also having the 
4 benefit and experience of practicing in the area of 
5 criminal law to be informed and knowledgeable regarding 
6 the rules of evidence as it relates to criminal law 
7 issues, as well as the rules of criminal procedure. Those 
8 are the kinds of concerns that I have regarding your 
9 ability to adequately represent yourself. Why is it you 
10 believe you are going to be able to master those rules 
11 in order to be able to present your defense in this 
12 case? 
13 MR. TENNEY: Well, with all due respect, Your 
14 Honor, I believe that I am the most qualified person in my 
15 case to do this. I do understand securities laws because 
16 I have studied them extensively. I have as my assistant 
17 in this case Candice Johnson of the Legal Defenders 
18 Office. I will admit I don't understand all the legal 
19 ramifications of the rules of evidence, however I am a 
20 I very quick study. I do learn and remember fairly well. 
21 In this case, as I understand it, there is a lot 
22 I difference between this and a civil case. I have done all 
23 of my own briefs and my own preparation. Tremendous 
24 J amount of paperwork. Not as much paperwork as in a 
criminal case. I have had a year basically to work with 25 
1 witnesses. I think I can argue both the facts of the law 
2 very well and I believe that I can also bring in witnesses 
3 that will help me establish that I have not acted with any 
4 criminal intent. What is called the "security law 
5 scienter." And I really don't think that I am going to 
6 have a problem with it. 
7 I talked to Ms. Johnson about this and there 
8 really isn't anyone who has the extensive securitiy 
9 background that I do. One of the problems in securities 
10 law, particularly as it relates to fraud, is that it is a 
11 very vague and fairly indefinable area. It is not in 
12 black and white as say some other kinds of criminal law 
13 might be. And I believe that it is very difficult to 
14 argue a case like this without the extensive knowledge 
15 of the facts. 
16 I know we have knowledge of the facts of 
17 securities, but I have far more knowledge of the facts of 
18 this case, and I really don't believe that I am going to 
19 have any problem with it. And the State has to establish 
20 their case beyond any reasonable doubt, and I believe I am 
21 not over-matched in this case because I come into court 
22 with a great deal of facts and the law on my side. 
23 THE COURT: And the record my reflect as well 
24 that Ms. Candice Johnson from the Legal Defenders 
25 Association, I believe, was appointed at the circuit court 
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level, not appointed to represent Mr. Tenney but 
appointed to assist him in representing himself, and she 
is in fact present in the courtroom at this time. 
Mr. Tenney, very briefly, in your own order, 
what is your understanding of the burden of proof of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt? 
MR. TENNEY: I believe that the State has to 
prove beyond any reasonable doubt that, first of all, I 
violated the facts of the law, the statutory law that 
required registration of my stock. I believe that the 
essence of this case starts with the registration or the 
exemption of my stock from registration. I believe that 
that is where it starts. 
THE COURT: Let me then interrupt you for a 
moment. Mr. Tenney, I don't want you to give me a 
recitation of the facts. I am just asking you what 
is your general understanding of the burden of proof 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt? What does that 
mean to you? What is your understanding? 
MR. TENNEY: It means two things to me. It 
means that the State has to establish the facts of the 
case that I violated a statutory law, specifically 
securities fraud. Secondly, I believe the State has to 
establish beyond any reasonable doubt that I acted with 
scienter or criminal intent. There are a number of court 
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1 cases on that that set out the guidelines and standards 
2 which the State must prove in order for me to even be shown 
3 J guilty of acting in a criminal fashion. 
4 THE COURT: Now, Mr. Tenneyf do you also 
5 understand that, of course, if you were qualified to 
6 have a lawyer appointed to represented you, that this 
7 Court would be more than willing to appoint a lawyer 
8 I to represent you in this case? 
9 1 MR. TENNEY: I do. I do understand that, 
10 I Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: And finally, Mr. Tenney, regarding 
12 this particular issue, do you understand the serious 
13 nature of the charges you are facing and, in fact, Mr. 
14 Tenney, that there is a reasonable likelihood that if you 
15 are convicted of these offenses, these offenses being 
16 felony offenses, and the State can correct me, I believe 
17 them to be third degree felony offenses. Of course, a 
18 third degree felony is punishable by zero to five years at 
19 the Utah State Prison. There is also a fine up to $5,000, 
20 I additionally there is also, Mr. Tenney that the sentences 
21 on the individual counts, this of course is assuming the 
22 jury had found you guilty, there is the potential of a 
23 consecutive sentencing as well. And needless to say, I 
24 think we are talking about approximately a 29-count 
25 Information. You start running something like that 
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consecutive, it is basically five times 29. This is a 
serious situation, not to even mention the potential 
orders of restitution. 
Do you truly appreciate and understand the 
serious nature of these charges, Mr. Tenney? 
MR. TENNEY: Probably better than anyone in 
the courtroom, Your Honor. I have been completely 
unwilling to settle this case on any terms because 
I am innocent. 
My understanding, if I am not mistaken, is that 
under the current law the fines actually could total 
$10,000 per charge, not $5,000, under the current law. 
A few years ago it was $5,000. Years ago I understand it 
was zero to three. Now I understand it is zero to five 
and, if I am not mistaken, there is a total of 32 counts 
times five. I calculate it is 160 years if served 
consecutively, and it is a total of $3,200,000 in fines, 
if I am not mistaken, under the current law. The law 
that was in existence at the time of these alleged 
infractions. 
THE COURT: Mr. Sonnenreich, is there something 
you wanted to add, sir? 
MR. SONNENREICH: Yes, Your Honor. I just 
wanted to clarify for the record that, of course, 
Mr. Tenney would be subject only to the penalties 
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l| only in effect at the time of the alleged offenses, 
2 and at that time it was a zero to three undesignated 
3 felony. For some reason it has always been an 
4 undesignated felony that never quite tracked. It is 
5 similar to a third degree felony, but it is actually 
6 a person could possibly do zero to three years, 
7 with somewhat a higher crime potential. 
8 MR. TENNEY: Be that as it may, it is somewhat 
9 irrelevant. I am going to turn 53 in two months and 
LO whether it be 99 years or 160 years, I couldn't possibly 
LI live the sentence. 
L2 THE COURT: The point I am getting at, Mr. 
L3 Tenney, is that you do understand the serious nature of 
L4 the charges that you are facing? 
L5 MR. TENNEY: I do. 
L6 THE COURT: And with all of that, it is still 
L7 your desire to represent yourself in this matter, 
18 Mr. Tenney? 
19 MR. TENNEY: Absolutely. 
20 THE COURT: Now, Mr. Tenney, do I also 
21 understand from a response that you gave me a moment ago, 
22 that there is no possibility whatsoever, other than the 
23 State outright dismissing the charges in the Information, 
2 4
 I that you are willing to enter into any type of plea 
agreement whatsoever? Is that a fair statement of your 25 
JLV 
position? 
MR. TENNEY: Not completely. I believe, Judge 
Medley, you may have also inherited a case from Judge 
Sawaya that is a civil case that has never been dismissed 
on the very same facts of this matter. 
THE COURT: Let me just — I apologize for 
interrupting you, Mr. Tenney, but I would just like for 
you to know that I am not aware of any civil case. I have 
not reviewed a civil case. I know nothing about that 
whatsoever. 
MR. TENNEY: It is approximately three-and- a 
half to four years old. It is a civil case filed by 
the State on the same — very same facts. 
THE COURT: What does that have to do with 
this criminal matter? 
MR. TENNEY: It is virtually the same 
information, the same facts. The criminal case, as I 
understand it, is based upon this same evidence that 
the State had for the civil case. A civil case was 
originally filed and then at a later date, a year ago, 
a criminal case was filed on essentially the same 
issues. 
I am willing to — I have even offered to the 
State to stipulate in the civil case, but the State seems 
determined to go forward with a criminal charge. I 
I X1 
ij believe this is properly a matter for the civil courts, 
2 I not the criminal courts anyway. But be that as it may, 
3 I would be willing to settle on the civil but not on 
4 the criminal. I am not guilty of criminal activity. 
5 THE COURT: Mr. Sonnenreich, what were you 
6 going to say? 
7 MR. SONNENREICH: I do believe, Your Honor, as a 
8 matter of record, that the civil case was dismissed in 
9 1991. 
10 MR. TENNEY: I am completely unaware of that. 
LI MR. SONNENREICH: I just wanted to say, that is 
12 our response. 
13 MR. TENNEY: If that is true, Your Honor, I 
14 would like to know — 
15 THE COURT: That is fine. Whether it was or 
16 whether it was not, I don't think is crucial at this 
17 point. What I am trying to determine, obviously, solely 
18 for calendaring purposes as to where we are headed on this 
19 case, if this case is a definite go or whether or not 
20 J there is the potential that this case is going to be 
21 resolved in some manner. That is why I put that question 
22 J to you. 
2 3
 THE COURT: The record should reflect that based 
24 1 on Mr. Tenney's responses, at this time the Court is 
251 satisfied that Mr. Tenney understands the serious nature 
uzzrt 
i I of the charges that he is facing. He appears to have a 
2 I substantial base of knowledge and experience as it relates 
31 to securities, and since this Court can't order Mr. Tenney 
4 I to have a lawyer to represent him, we have no choice — 
5 J this Court has no choice but to allow Mr. Tenney to go 
6 I forward and pro se representing himself. Even though, Mr. 
7 Tenney, it would be my advice to you that you should 
8 really have a lawyer to represent you on this case, but 
9 you don't want to follow that advice do you, sir? 
10 MR. TENNEY: I don't, Your Honor, with all due 
11 respect. 
! I 
12 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Tenney. You may be 
13 seated, sir. I would like to go to the State now and just 
14 give you an opportunity to make some comments regarding 
15 the motion that you have filed. And let me say to you 
16 that I have had a chance to read through the motion. I 
17 have not had a full opportunity to compare the cites to 
18 the Rules of Evidence regarding hearsay rules and 
19 regarding authentication. I haven't had a chance to 
20 compare those rules to the exhibits that you are asking 
21 the Court to receive, but I would like to give you a 
22 brief opportunity, counsel, to make your position 
2 3
 at this time. 
2 4
 MR. SONNENREICH: Thank you, Your Honor. There 
2 J 5 J are a number of matters that I would like to address today 
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ADDENDUM K 
I n s t r u c t i o n N o s . 4 1 , 4 2 , 45 
INSTRUCTION NO. // 
In order for you to find the defendant, John B. Tenney, guilty 
of the crime of "EMPLOYING AN UNREGISTERED AGENT19, as alleged in 
Count Twenty-eight (28) of the Amended Information, you must find 
from the evidence all of the following elements of the crime: 
1. Sometime subsequent to April 17, 1987, in the State of 
Utah, John B. Tenney, a broker-dealer or issuer: 
2. Willfully; 
3. Employed Steven Rick Jensen; 
4. To offer or sell any security; 
5. To Jeffrey Stout, Jeffrey, Richard and Rocky Ulibarri, or 
Kristy and Phillip Holmes; 
6. When Steven Rick Jensen was not licensed as an agent with 
the Utah Division of Securities. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find the defendant guilty as to Count Twenty-eight 
(28) of the Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one or more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-eight (28) . 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
In order for you to find the defendant, John B. Tenney, guilty 
of the crime of "EMPLOYING AN UNREGISTERED AGENT", as alleged in 
Count Twenty-nine (29) of the Amended Information, you must find 
from the evidence all of the following elements of the crime: 
1. Sometime subsequent to April 17, 1987, in the State of 
Utah, John B. Tenney, a broker-dealer or issuer: 
2. Willfully; 
3. Employed Steven Bowers; 
4. To offer or sell any security; 
5. To Gerald Berg; 
6. When Steven Bowers was not licensed as an agent with the 
Utah Division of Securities. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find the defendant guilty as to Count Twenty-nine (29) 
of the Information. If you believe that the evidence has failed to 
establish one or more of the above elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt, it shall be your duty to find the defendant not guilty of 
the crime charged in Count Twenty-nine (29) • 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that the term "agent", for purposes of 
Utah's securities laws, means any individual other than a broker-
dealer who represents a broker-dealer or issuer in effecting or 
attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities. 
You are further instructed that the term "broker-dealer", for 
purposes of Utah's securities laws, means any person engaged in the 
business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of 
others or for his own account. 
The term "issuer" means any person who issues or proposes to 
issue any security or has outstanding a security that it has 
issued. 
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ADDENDUM L 
Instruction No. 52 
INSTRUCTION NO- ^ 
You are instructed that the Defendant is responsible for any 
statements made on his behalf by his authorized salesmen or agents 
in connection with any offer or sale of securities. In other 
words, if you find from the evidence that such a salesman or agent 
made statements to potential investors and that the Defendant 
authorized those statements, then under the law the Defendant is 
responsible for the making of those statements as if he had made 
them himself. 
Similarly, if any authorized agent omitted to state a material 
fact, in connection with the offer or sale of a security, and the 
Defendant or the agent had a duty to disclose the fact, and you 
find that the Defendant did not inform the agent of the omitted 
fact, or did not take sufficient steps to ensure that investors 
would be informed of the material fact, the Defendant is 
responsible for the omission of the fact as if he himself had 
omitted it. 
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ADDENDUM M 
I n s t r u c t i o n No. 48 , 65 
INSTRUCTION NO. HP 
You are instructed that while a number of misrepresentations 
and omissions are alleged as the basis for the charges of 
securities fraud, it is not incumbent upon the state to prove each 
and every one of them. It is enough that the state prove to your 
satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt with regard to each 
individual count of securities fraud, that a false statement or 
material omission was made in connection with that count. Further, 
it is not necessary that all of the securities fraud counts have 
the same material misrepresentation or omission. Each count may 
have a different, or the same misrepresentation or omission. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. Y 
When you retire to deliberate, you should appoint one of your 
number as foreman, who will preside over your deliberations. Your 
verdict must be in writing, signed by your foreman, and when found 
must be returned by you into court. 
In this case, it requires a unanimous agreement of all the 
jurors to find a verdict. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 1 of the Amended Information: Offering or Selling 
Unregistered Securities, a felony; or you may find him not guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 2 of the Amended Information: Offering or Selling 
Unregistered Securities, a felony; or you may find him not guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 3 of the Amended Information: Offering or Selling 
Unregistered Securities, a felony; or you may find him not guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 4 of the Amended Information: Offering or Selling 
Unregistered Securities, a felony; or you may find him not guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 5 of the Amended Information: Offering or Selling 
Unregistered Securities, a felony; or you may find him not guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 6 of the Amended Information: Offering or Selling 
CG76S 
Unregistered Securities, a felony; or you may find him not guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 7 of the Amended Information: Offering or Selling 
Unregistered Securities, a felony; or you may find him not guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 8 of the Amended Information: Offering or Selling 
Unregistered Securities, a felony; or you may find him not guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 9 of the Amended Information: Offering or Selling 
Unregistered Securities, a felony; or you may find him not guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 10 of the Amended Information: Offering or Selling 
Unregistered Securities, a felony; or you may find him not guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 11 of the Amended Information: Offering or Selling 
Unregistered Securities, a felony; or you may find him not guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 12 of the Amended Information: Offering or Selling 
Unregistered Securities, a felony; or you may find him not guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 13 of the Amended Information: Offering or Selling 
Unregistered Securities, a felony; or you may find him not guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 14 of the Amended Information: Securities Fraud, a felony; 
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or you may find him not guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 15 of the Amended Information: Securities Fraud, a felony; 
or you may find him not guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 16 of the Amended Information: Securities Fraud, a felony; 
or you may find him not guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 17 of the Amended Information: Securities Fraud, a felony; 
or you may find him not guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 18 of the Amended Information: Securities Fraud, a felony; 
or you may find him not guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 19 of the Amended Information: Securities Fraud, a felony; 
or you may find him not guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 20 of the Amended Information: Securities Fraud, a felony; 
or you may find him not guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 21 of the Amended Information: Securities Fraud, a felony; 
or you may find him not guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 22 of the Amended Information: Securities Fraud, a felony; 
r\ p ^  <n -Q 
or you may find him not guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 23 of the Amended Information: Securities Fraud, a felony; 
or you may find him not guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 24 of the Amended Information: Securities Fraud, a felony; 
or you may find him not guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 25 of the Amended Information: Securities Fraud, a felony; 
or you may find him not guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 26 of the Amended Information: Securities Fraud, a felony; 
or you may find him not guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 27 of the Amended Information: Unregistered Securities 
Broker-Dealer or Sales Agent, a felony; or you may find him not 
guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 28 of the Amended Information: Employing Unregistered 
Agents, a felony; or you may find him not guilty. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in 
Count 29 of the Amended Information: Employing Unregistered 
Agents, a felony; or you may find him not guilty. 
C07CS 
Verdict forms have been prepared and will be given to you when 
you retire to deliberate. Your verdict should be a result of your 
deliberations. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of all twenty-nine counts 
alleged in the Amended Information, or you may find him not guilty 
of any of the twenty-nine counts alleged in the Amended 
Information, or you may find him guilty of some, but not all, of 
the twenty-nine counts alleged in the Amended Information. 
Dated this day of May, 1993., 
TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
'<-/-7? 
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ADDENDUM N 
Frampton Colloquy 
FRAMPTON COLLOQUY 
1. Have you ever studied law? 
2. Have you ever represented yourself or any other 
defendant in a criminal action? 
3. You realize, do you not, that you are charged with 
these crimes: (Here state the crimes with which the defendant is 
charged.) 
4. You realize, do you not, that if you are found guilty 
of the crime charged in Count I, the court • . . could sentence you 
to as much as years in prison and fine you as much as 
$ ? (Then ask him a similar question with respect to each 
other crime with which he may be charged in the indictment or 
information.) 
5. You realize, do you not, that if you are found guilty 
of more than one of those crimes this court can order that the 
sentences be served consecutively, that is, one after another? 
6. You realize, do you not, that if you represent 
yourself, you are on your own? I cannot tell you how you should try 
your case or even advise you as to how to try your case. 
7. Are you familiar with the . . . Rules of Evidence? 
8. You realize, do you not, that the . . . Rules of 
Evidence govern what evidence may or may not be introduced at trial 
and, in representing yourself, you must abide by those rules? 
9. Are you familiar with the . . . Rules of Criminal 
Procedure? 
10. You realize, do you not, that those rules govern the 
way in which a criminal action is tried in . . . court? 
11. You realize, do you not, that if you decide to take 
the witness stand, you must present your testimony by asking 
questions of yourself? You cannot just take the stand and tell your 
story. You must proceed question by question through your testimony. 
12. (Then say to the defendant something to this effect): 
I must advise you that in my opinion you would be far better 
defended by a trained lawyer than you can be by yourself. I think 
it is unwise of you to try to represent yourself. You are not 
familiar with the law. You are not familiar with court procedure. 
You are not familiar with the Rules of Evidence. I would strongly 
urge you not to try to represent yourself. 
13. Now, in light of the penalty that you might suffer if 
you are found guilty and in light of all the difficulties of 
representing yourself, is it still your desire to represent yourself 
and to give up your right to be represented by a lawyer? 
14. Is your decision entirely voluntary on your part? 
15. If the answers to the two preceding questions are in 
the affirmative, you should then say something to the following 
effect: "I find that the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily 
waived his right to counsel. I will therefore permit him to 
represent himself." 
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16. You should consider the appointment of standby counsel 
to assist the defendant and to replace him if the court should 
determine during trial that the defendant can no longer be permitted 
to represent himself. 
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